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Abstract
We explore how public opinion polls affect candidates’ campaign spending in political compe-
tition. Generally, polls lead to (more) asymmetric behavior. Under a majority rule there always
exists an equilibrium in which the initially more popular candidate invests more in the campaign
and thereby increases her lead in expectation: polls create momentum. When campaigning is very
effective and the race is very close, a second type of equilibrium may exist: the trailing candidate
outspends and overtakes his opponent. Regardless of the type of equilibrium, polls have a tendency
to decrease expected total campaigning expenditures by amplifying ex-ante asymmetries between
candidates and thus defusing competition. When candidates care also for their vote share in addi-
tion to having the majority, candidates’ incentives crucially depend on the distribution of voters’
candidate preferences.
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1 Introduction
While an informed electorate is generally considered essential for a well-functioning democracy, one
exception concerns polls of candidates’ relative standing. Critics claim that polls undermine both the
incentive to vote as well as the vote itself; thus distorting voting decisions. As a consequence the
preferences of the populace are warped by the echo chamber of opinion polls. For this reason, many
countries have imposed a ban on the publication of pre-election polling results. This ban can range from
one day before the election, as in France, to a whole month before the election, as in Luxembourg.1
Candidates, however, are still allowed to commission opinion polls, even if the general public is not
allowed access to the results. In this paper we study the effect of opinion polls on candidates’ incentives
to invest in their campaign. These investments in turn influence the voters’ ballot choice on election
day and thus the final election outcome.
Polls are ubiquitous. In addition to traditional providers like Gallup and Rasmussen Reports, news-
papers and TV stations conduct their own polls. Poll aggregator websites, such as realclearpolitics.com
collect the plethora of poll results and offer a structured overview to the public. In addition, prediction
markets such as politicalbetting.com and oddschecker.com offer alternative sources of voters’ approval
(Berg, Nelson, and Rietz, 2008). Given the relevance of polls, numerous studies have analyzed the
various channels through which information about candidates’ relative standing might affect voters’
behavior. A prominent hypothesis is the existence of a bandwagon effect, which posits that voters
increasingly cast their vote for candidates doing well in the polls. This suggests that polls create mo-
mentum in the sense that the front-runner improves his position over time. However, there are also
studies predicting anti-momentum, for example due to a mobilization effect, with the consequence that
the front-runner in the polls experiences a loss of support in the election.
While scholars show a strong interest in the analysis of voters’ reaction to polls, the other side of the
political market – the politicians and parties – has been virtually neglected. To increase their chances of
election, political candidates invest aggressively into their campaigns: Total campaign spending during
the 2012 Presidential Campaign in the United States amounted to more than USD 2 billion.2 Because
the fraction of partisan voters has been shrinking in many countries (e.g. Dalton and Wattenberg
1Source: http://aceproject.org. Accessed: September 10, 2013.
2Source: http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12. Accessed: September 10, 2013.
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(2001)), there are more swing voters to be swayed in a campaign, making campaigning increasingly im-
portant in determining the election outcome. Advances in social media and communication technology
offer a plethora of new channels to target specific voter groups more effectively and thus increase the
impact of a campaigning dollar.
Voter preferences and voting intentions are not directly observable to the political candidates and
typically change over the course of time due to taste or information shocks. The possibility of reliable
up-to-date information about candidates’ relative standing is thus at the heart of our analysis. We
analyze how this information influences the incentives of candidates to spend in the course of their
political campaign. In particular, we are interested in how candidates’ relative incentives to compete
are affected and whether polls affect the likelihood of an incumbent winning the election. We construct
a model in which candidates for political office may spend resources early and late in the campaign to
gain voters’ support. If there is no poll, candidates a priori have a common belief about the median
voter’s candidate ranking and cannot update their beliefs as the election day comes closer. If there is
a poll, candidates know the median’s candidate ranking when making their investment decisions. Our
main results are as follows:
• If candidates are mainly concerned with winning the election, polls give the front-runner an
incentive to campaign harder than her opponent and thereby create momentum. Thus, there
always exists an equilibrium where the front-runner increases her lead in expectation.
• In an environment where candidates’ campaign expenditures are highly effective in influencing
voters, polls may also create anti-momentum. The trailing candidate may run a more costly
campaign than his adversary, but only if candidates have relatively similar popularity. Equilibria
with momentum and anti-momentum co-exist.
• Increasing the precision of polls has an ambiguous effect. In close races more precise polls lead to
stronger momentum. In very lopsided races momentum decreases as polls become more precise,
because candidates slack off in a mostly decided race.
• Polls can make a campaign both more and less wasteful in terms of aggregate expenditures. If
(but not only if) the spending elasticity of campaigning costs decreases polls decrease aggregate
spending and thus wastefulness.
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• When candidates are sufficiently interested in their vote shares and not only in gaining a majority,
unique equilibria exhibiting anti-momentum may occur in a polarized electorate.
To illustrate the intuition behind our results consider two ex-ante equally popular candidates. They
campaign over a certain period of time and during this time random (unobservable) shocks to their
popularity occur. Without a poll, candidates never learn about their current standing with the voter
and thus at any point in time incentives are completely symmetric. With polls on the other hand,
candidates receive updates about their current relative standing. This alters their incentives in the
following way. A candidate who receives the information that she is ahead, now has an additional
incentive to invest. The reason is that any additional investment now affords her an even greater lead
in expectation in the next poll. This in turn decreases the expected intensity and thus expected costs
of future competition. A trailing candidate on the other hand has a weaker incentive to invest. Any
additional unit of investment now brings him closer in expectation to his opponent in the next poll
and thus it makes future competition more fierce and costly in expectation. Consequently polls drive
a wedge between the investment incentives of the trailing and leading candidate and thereby create
momentum.
When campaigning is relatively effective and the candidates are relatively close, this intuition is
valid for the trailing candidate as well. A large investment helps him overtake his opponent and at
the same time defuse future competition in expectation. In these situations both candidates have an
incentive to preempt the other with the objective to save costs in the future. In terms of aggregate
expenditures of the candidates, note that initial asymmetries are amplified through a poll. This tends to
defuse competition and thus lower investments into the campaigns. In addition though, the candidates
also face a less noisy decision environment, which has a differential effect on expenditures. The overall
effect of polls on wastefulness is thus ambiguous.
The paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section we review the relevant literature.
Section 2 sets up and explains the basic model. In Section 3 we explore the effect of providing informa-
tion through polls in a system of pure majority voting. We discuss the effect of polls on the intensity
of political competition in Section 4 and candidates’ expected spending profiles in Section 5. Section
6 contains extensions of the basic model. First we show that our technical assumptions are not too
restrictive and that in a more general model our findings will be qualitatively preserved. In the second
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part of the section we study the effects of polls when candidates care not only about majorities but
also about their actual vote shares. In the third part we study imprecise polls. We conclude the section
with a discussion of the costs of campaigning. Section 7 concludes. We relegate all formal proofs to
the appendix.
Related Literature Other scholars have directed their attention to the effect of polls on election out-
comes. The incentives to conduct polls about voters’ policy preferences to inform campaign positioning
choices are analyzed for example in Bernhardt, Duggan, and Squintani (2009) and Jacobs and Shapiro
(1994). In contrast, we focus on the financial aspect of campaigning. In our paper polls inform about
candidates’ relative standing and we study how polls inform campaign expenditure decisions. Earlier
models of how candidates use their money and time during an electoral contest were studied for example
by Brams and Davis (1973, 1974), Snyder (1989), Skaperdas and Grofman (1995), Stromberg (2008),
Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2013), Denter (2013), and Meirowitz (2008). To be able to study polls and
the associated repercussions for electoral outcomes, we study candidate incentives in a dynamic cam-
paigning model. The dynamic nature of the model is essential, since the effects we are interested in can
only emerge if candidates can learn over time. The only other paper we are aware of studying dynamics
in a strategic model of campaign spending is Klumpp and Polborn (2006). While the authors study
incentives in sequential electoral contests during the primaries, we consider spending dynamics and the
role of informational feedback within a single contest.
Also the effect of polls on voters’ decisions has been investigated. Among others Hong and Konrad
(1998), Straffin Jr. (1977), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), Callander (2007), as well as
Ali and Kartik (2012) show how polls can distort voters’ decisions at the ballot in favor of the more pop-
ular/leading candidate. Rationales for this bandwagon effect include information cascades, the desire to
vote for the winner, and voters’ aversion to uncertainty. Other authors, e.g. Goeree and Großer (2007),
argue in the opposite direction, claiming that leading in the polls might actually be harmful, due to a
negative mobilization effect. A number of empirical papers have tried to falsify one or the other hypoth-
esis, but by now evidence is at best inconclusive (see for example Blais, Gidengil, and Nevitte (2006);
McAllister and Studlar (1991); Nadeau, Cloutier, and Guay (1993); Vowles (2002); Knight and Schiff
(2010)). Our paper also addresses the effect of polls on voting decisions and election outcomes, but
through an indirect channel: the strategies of political candidates. Candidates vie for voters by spending
5
time and money on their campaign. We study how candidates’ incentives to engage in such persuasive
efforts are affected by polls.
Showing that polls may cause momentum in favor of the front-runner, our paper also adds to the
literature identifying and explaining an incumbency advantage in political competition. For some early
empirical evidence on the existence of an incumbency advantage see for example Erikson (1971) or
Gelman and King (1990). A textbook justification for this phenomenon are political business cycles as
studied by Nordhaus (1975) or Drazen (2001). A consequence of these theories is that incumbents are
likely to have popularity advantages at the outset of a campaign. Our paper shows that this advantage
is likely to be amplified through opinion polls.
The momentum effect we identify is closely related to the so-called “discouragement effect” found
in dynamic sequential contests (Konrad, 2012). The main intuition here is that the outcome of the
present contest or battle affects the perceived value of future contests through its effect on the expected
future effort costs. In some cases, such as in Klumpp and Polborn (2006) this effect can also magnify
initial advantages. Konrad (2012) illustrates this effect for models of the “tug-o-war” and the “race”
class. We show that this effect is also relevant for a different class of models, where competition takes
place over a fixed time horizon.
Finally, a literature that is related because of the class of models employed analyzes workers’
incentives in labor market tournaments. Aoyagi (2010), Ederer (2010), Gershkov and Perry (2009)
as well as Klein and Schmutzler (2013) study the optimal feedback policy of a principal in a dynamic
promotion tournament, where the principal’s goal is the maximization of aggregate effort. We add to
this literature in two ways. First, in order to study momentum in a campaign we depart from the
modeling practice of this literature by looking at multiple feedback stages and ex-ante asymmetric
candidates. Second, we study the effect of two different “reward schemes:” promotions (concern for
winning) and sharing of a bonus (concerns for vote share). Empirical evidence on dynamic tournaments
with and without feedback is discussed for example in Fershtman and Gneezy (2011). They find that
feedback about relative performance increased the quitting rate among 10th graders in a 60m race.
This is in line with our theoretical findings.
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Figure 1: Timing.
2 The model
Two candidates, i ∈ {F, T} compete for voters’ approval over two stages, t = 1 and t = 2. We assume
that policy platforms were chosen and committed to before t = 1. Campaigning in t = 1 and t = 2 is
thus purely persuasive and candidates sway voters by choosing investments xti ≥ 0, i = F, T , t = 1, 2,
which can for example be thought of as TV advertisements or public appearances. Throughout the
campaign, candidates experience random shocks to their popularity. Polls inform candidates about
their relative standing. In stage three, t = 3, the election takes place. Figure 1 summarizes the timing
of the game.
We assume that a simple majority rule is used (“first past the post”-system, FPTP). This implies
that candidates vie for the median voter. The median voter votes for the candidate which affords her
the highest expected utility. Formally, we define the (perceived) difference in utilities between candidate
F and T on election day (t = 3) as3
d3 = a+
2∑
t=1
(
xtF − xtT
)− 2∑
t=1
et (1)
The first term, a represents the realized utility difference at the outset of the campaign before any
campaign effort was chosen. In case the election were held just before period 1 a would solely determine
the election outcome. This parameter can be interpreted as containing the prior decisions on policy
3In many situations, e.g. with a multi-dimensional policy space, a median voter may fail to exist. In these situations,
our so called median voter may also be interpreted simply as a decisive voter. For example, if there are n issues, let
preferences of voter v be of the following form:
d
3
v =
2∑
t=1
(
x
t
F − x
t
T
)
−
2∑
t=1
e
t
−
n∑
m=1
w
m
[
(bmv − p
m
F )
2
− (bmv − p
m
T )
2
]
,
where wmv ≥ 0 are issue weights, p
m
i candidate i’s position in issue m, and voters’ bliss points b
m
v are distributed on
some n-dimensional policy space. Then it is always possible to choose xi in such a way that the electorate is split evenly
between candidates and each receives a popular vote of 50 percent. The type of voter (identified by her bliss point) that
is indifferent between candidates in such a situation is the decisive voter that we are referring to as median voter.
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platforms, the valence of the candidates, an incumbency advantage or random events prior to t =
1. From the candidates’ perspective a is the realization of a random variable α, which is normally
distributed with mean µα and variance σ
2
α. The second term represents the difference in campaigning
efforts between F and T in period 1 and 2. Thus, if F outspends T , she will, ceteris paribus, increase her
popularity with the median voter. Finally, et is the realization of a (macro)-shock after the investment
decision in period t = 1 and t = 2. This shock is common to the whole populace and thus the identity
of the median does not change over time.4 An example for such a shock is a blunder in a publicly
broadcasted speech. For example in the midst of economic turmoils 2008 Republican U.S. presidential
nominee John McCain claimed that “the fundamentals are strong”, making him look extremely out of
touch with reality5. We denote the respective random variables corresponding to realizations e1 and e2
as ǫ1 and ǫ2 and assume that they are independently drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero
and variance σ2ǫ .
6 On election day, the median voter votes for candidate F if d3 > 0, while he votes for
candidate T if d3 < 0. If the median voter is indifferent (d3 = 0) so is the electorate as a whole, and
both candidates receive a vote share of 50 percent. Denote by δ3 the random variable belonging to d3.
d2 and δ2 are defined analogously as the (realized) difference in perceived utility in t = 2. Since a = d1
we will use only the former. Throughout the paper, we shall use the symbols φ and Φ to denote the
PDF and CDF of the standard normal distribution where needed.
4The assumption of such a ’macro’ shock is not necessary, but significantly simplifies the exposition. However, in
general the shocks could as well have any other form that allows inferring the expected ranking of candidates in the next
stage. In that case the identity of the median voter changes over time.
5http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/world/americas/17iht-mccain.4.16251777.html.
6There are many other possible interpretations. For example Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, and Mierau (2008) show the
influence of terrorist attacks on politicians’ popularity. While this may still be related to policy or qualification, other
studies show that pure random events – from the point of view of a politician – influence election outcomes. For example,
Healy, Malhotra, and Mo (2010) study the impact of local college football games just before an election takes place. If
the local team wins, the incumbent’s chances to win improve significantly. Similarly, natural disasters may have a direct
influence of voters’ candidate ranking. A recent example for such a shock is the disaster caused by the damaged Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan that followed the earthquake and the thereby caused tsunami of March 11, 2011.
In the aftermath, in many countries around the world a shift of voters’ preferences in favor of green or anti-nuclear
movements was accounted for. In the U.S., support for nuclear energy dropped to a historical low, with numbers even
beneath those immediately after the Three Mile Island incident in 1979 (Cooper and Sussman, 2011). In Germany, the
Green Party’s support surged in the disaster’s aftermath and helped them to win the state election in one of Germany’s
most influential states, Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, which until then was a traditional stronghold of the conservative party CDU
of Angela Merkel (Dempsey, 2011). Similar shifts in public opinion happened in other countries, such as France (Buffery,
2011), Switzerland (Kanter, 2011), and India (Gupta, 2011). Apart from shocks to candidate ranking, ǫ may as well be
interpreted as a random shock muting candidates’ campaign efforts in a given stage, so that effective effort is not xti but
xti−ǫ
t
i. This is a standard assumption in the literature on labor tournaments that has been pioneered by Lazear and Rosen
(1981) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983). In the context of political competition it may represent uncertainty about the
effects of campaign spending, and that campaigning might backfire as well (e.g. Dukakis in the tank). Finally, it may be
interpreted as a poll’s error (see Section 6.3).
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The candidates’ objective functions are equal to
E[πF ] = Pr
(
δ3 > 0
)− c
2
(x1F )
2 − c
2
(x2F )
2,
E[πT ] = Pr
(
δ3 < 0
)− c
2
(x1T )
2 − c
2
(x2T )
2.
We normalize the utility from holding office to one. By equation (1) we see that expending campaigning
effort xti, t = 1, 2 increases the chances of winning the median voter’s vote and thus the election.
Furthermore, two types of factors not under the control of the candidates are relevant for the probability
of capturing the median voter on election day. On the one hand there is uncertainty about the exogenous
policy taste parameter α of the median voter. Thus, one candidate may start the campaign in t = 1
with a popularity advantage. Without loss of generality we focus on situations where µα > 0 and thus
we refer to candidate F as the “expected front-runner”.7 Similarly, when analyzing the candidates’
decisions with polls we focus on cases where a > 0 and d2 > 0 such that we refer to candidate F
as the current “front-runner”. Furthermore, the realizations of the two macro shocks ǫ1 and ǫ2 add
uncertainty in each stage. Investments come at quadratic costs C(xti) =
c
2(x
t
i)
2, c > 0. The convexity
of costs may reflect the fact that the opportunity costs of fundraising go up with every dollar already
raised or that each additional unit of investment becomes less effective at a given point in time.8 For
example, if we interpret spending xti as a measure of how many voters a candidate reaches at a given
time, convex costs would imply it gets harder and harder for the candidates to reach yet another voter
with their messages. Note that the objective function need not be concave in candidates’ investments.
Thus, in the main part of the paper we focus on situations where c, σα, and σǫ are sufficiently high
such that pure strategy equilibria exist.
3 The effect of polls
We now start our analysis of the campaign by studying candidate behavior in a FPTP electoral system.
A candidate’s goal is to win the simple majority of votes and thus, as long as a majority is achieved,
7F can also be interpreted as the incumbent and µα as the expected incumbency advantage.
8One might argue that candidates in a campaign are budget constrained. They cannot spend more money than is
donated by their supporters. While this is true in the short run, over the course of the campaign, candidates can invest
in fundraising and open up new sources of funding. Thus, we believe it is reasonable for our purposes to assume that
spending has some opportunity costs which increase with the amount of campaigning effort expended in a given period.
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the candidate is indifferent whether he wins by a small or by a large margin. We discuss an extension
in Section 6.
In order to identify the effect of polls we consider two polar cases: a situation without any poll, and
thus no information about current relative standing, and a situation where polls perfectly reveal current
popularity before each investment decision is taken by the candidates. First consider as a benchmark
a situation without any poll.
3.1 A campaign without a poll
In both t = 1 and t = 2 the candidates have the opportunity to buy TV ads for their campaigns. Absent
a poll they do not receive a signal as to their current popularity with the electorate in either stage and
thus they base their decisions solely on their common prior beliefs Φ
(
α
σα
)
. The next proposition
summarizes our first result:
Proposition 1. The equilibrium of the campaigning game without polls is unique. Both candidates
choose identical investments in each stage, and investments are also identical across stages. Conse-
quently, absent a poll the ex-ante expected popular vote of a candidate in t = 3 is identical to his
popularity in t = 1.
Proof. See appendix.
We find that efforts are completely identical, even if the front-runner F has an expected popularity
advantage. To see why it is instructive to look at candidates’ marginal incentives. For a realized median
position a, note that the marginal increase in popular vote / probability to win of F is exactly the
share (density) of currently indifferent voters. Of course, this also holds for T . Taking into account
uncertainty about α this must hold also in expectation. Moreover, since candidates have identical costs
of investment, they also have identical marginal products and marginal costs of spending. Consequently,
for any prior distribution Φ
(
α
σα
)
both candidates have identical marginal incentives, and hence the
equilibrium must be symmetric. This is similar to a result by Lazear and Rosen (1981) in their analysis
of labor market tournaments, when a candidate enjoys a head start.
A direct implication of the proposition is, that the campaigning stage does not have any effect on
the expected winner of the election, absent polls. Candidates choose identical investments, the net
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effect is zero, and the winning probability will be unaffected in equilibrium. Here we clearly see how
political campaigns, or contests in general, are similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma: both candidates
would be better of by reducing spending by some k > 0, or by spending nothing at all. However,
individually they have an incentive to outspend their opponent.
3.2 A campaign with polls
In most modern democracies polls are a pervasive element of the political landscape. Information about
relative popularity is accessible in abundance. Apart from polls, politicians may learn more about their
popularity from prediction markets on the internet. Thus, candidates can react to changes in their
popularity, and, at the same time, even if popularity does not change over time (e.g. a = d2), this
gives additional information to the candidates. After all, learning about the popularity in t = 2 is
confounded by less noise than it was in t = 1, and for sure by less than absent any feedback. In this
section we introduce polls into the political campaign. Before their investment decisions in t = 1, 2
both candidates learn their relative popularity with the median voter d1 = a and d2 = a+x1F −x1T −e1.
3.2.1 Stage 2
We start with the candidates’ investment decisions in stage 2. After learning d2 through the poll, both
candidates decide on x2i . This situation is strategically similar to the situation in the absence of polls,
with one distinction: the amount of uncertainty until the election in t = 3 is reduced. But we have
seen from Proposition 1 that the amount of uncertainty was not decisive for relative incentives. Hence,
although investment levels differ from the situation without poll, candidates in stage 2 also choose
identical investments.
Proposition 2. There is a unique equilibrium in stage 2. Both candidates choose identical investments,
no matter what their popularity advantage in t = 2.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition for the symmetry of investments is identical to before: by marginally increasing
spending, the additional probability to win equals exactly the opponent’s loss in winning probability;
the marginal benefit of investment is identical for both candidates independent of their popularity.
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Because marginal costs are also identical, both must choose identical spending. Hence, we can conclude
that the expected popular vote a candidate gets in t = 3, E[δ3] equals his popularity in stage 2, d2.
What are the properties of stage 2 investments? Intuitively, higher marginal costs c decrease
spending. The effect of increasing the noisiness of the macro shock σǫ is ambiguous. Increasing σǫ
implies φ goes up at the tails and goes down in the center, overall becoming flatter. Therefore, in case
competition is lopsided with one candidate enjoying a popularity advantage, increasing the variance of
the shock increases equilibrium spending. Intuitively, if the variance is large the trailing candidate has a
realistic chance to catch up without spending overly in the campaign. This also gives him an incentive to
increase spending, since, as we have discussed before, φ determines the marginal product of investment.
To the contrary, if σǫ is relatively low, catching up due to luck is relatively unlikely, and hence the
trailing candidate has no incentive to compete. As a result both candidates’ investments decrease. In
case candidates are similarly popular an increase in variance always decreases the incentives to invest, as
the marginal product of investment goes down. Finally consider the effect of the popularity advantage
d2. This comparative static is of special importance for the candidates as they are able to influence
their popularity through investing in stage 1. Since the second stage equilibrium is symmetric, the
difference in spending, x2F − x2T , is zero, independent of d2. Thus, the marginal increase in the winning
probability in equilibrium is equal to the density of the shock, evaluated at d2, 1σǫφ(
d2
σǫ
). The normal
density is strictly quasi-concave and symmetric at zero and thus φ(d2σǫ ) is strictly decreasing in |d2|.
This implies spending decreases as |d2| gets larger. Thus, the intensity of competition in t = 2 increases
as the popularity difference vanishes.
3.2.2 Stage 1
Next turn to stage 1. How does the existence of a poll in period 2 affect candidates’ incentives? In order
to answer this question we focus, for the moment, on situations where pure strategy equilibria exist.9
This depends on the cost parameter c and the variance of the macro shock σ2ǫ , or more specifically,
on ρ := cσ2ǫ . We can interpret ρ as a measure of how expensive it is to gain a substantial advantage
through investing in a close campaign. Obviously higher marginal costs, c, make it more expensive to
campaign, regardless of the closeness of the race. A high variance σ2ǫ implies the density in the center
9We consider an extension in Section 6.
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of the shock distribution is low. Thus, on the margin, publishing TV ads in a close race has only a
small impact on the probability to win the campaign. First we consider ρ’s such that a unique pure
strategy equilibrium exists. Specifically we require ρ to be sufficiently large or ρ > (3
3
4
√
π)−1 = ρ¯.10
Consider the decision each candidate has to make in t = 1. There are three different channels
through which his decision influences a candidate’s expected utility. First, campaigning effort increases
the probability to win the election. This effect is, as in the previous section, identical for both, and hence
cannot be a cause of differences in campaign disbursements. Second, spending has immediate costs.
But candidates have identical cost functions, and hence marginal costs are also identical. Therefore,
this cannot be a reason for different behavior, either. There is, however, a third channel. By increasing
spending in t = 1 a candidate changes the expected state of the campaign in t = 2 in her favor,
because E[δ2] = a + x1F − x1T ; the marginal impact of investment in t = 1 on E[δ2] is equal to one.
Changing E[δ2] has consequences for expected future spending, and hence for expected future costs.
From the discussion of the comparative statics in t = 2 we know that costs are highest when the
race is tied, d2 = 0, and that costs decrease monotonically if we let |d2| grow, because equilibrium
spending goes down. This implies that the leading candidate, by exerting campaign effort in stage
1, locally increases |d2| in expectation and hence decreases her expected costs in stage 2, while the
opposite holds for the trailing candidate. In more technical terms, this implies the leading candidate’s
efforts in stage 1 and 2 are strategic substitutes, while the trailing candidates efforts are strategic
complements (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985)). This implies that the leader has lower
(expected) marginal costs of investment than her opponent. As a consequence, she spends more in
equilibrium and thereby in expectation increase the difference to her opponent. We have a situation in
which the leader acts tough, while her opponent takes a softer stance. We summarize this result in the
following proposition:
Proposition 3. Assume ρ > ρ¯. In the unique equilibrium the candidate leading in the poll chooses
greater investment in stage 1 than her opponent. If the race is tied both candidates choose identical
spending.
Proof. See appendix.
Together Propositions 2 and 3 characterize the candidates’ spending decisions over the course of
10A proof of this condition can be found in the appendix together with the proof of the next proposition.
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the campaign. While in stage 1 spending is typically asymmetric, with the front-runner outspending
the trailing candidate, expenditures are symmetric just before the election in stage 2. Overall, with
polls, the front-runner enjoys momentum in expectation, i.e. an initial lead grows in expectation over
time. In Proposition 1 we characterized spending decisions absent polls. We found that behavior is
completely symmetric and thus an initial advantage translates into an equal expected advantage. With
these observations we can state our main result:
Corollary 1. The effect of polls: If it is not too cheap to change a close outcome in expectation,
ρ > ρ¯, polls create momentum in favor of the front-runner. Thus, the introduction of polls increases
the likelihood that the front-runner wins the election.
Proof. This follows immediately from Propositions 1, 2 and 3.
We find that the availability of information about relative popularity crucially changes the incentives
of the candidates. In fact, a candidate starting into the campaign with an incumbency advantage will
make this advantage grow over time in expectation as the campaign progresses.
So far we have assumed that ρ is sufficiently large. When ρ is small campaigning is very effective and
cheap. Thus, influencing future popularity through campaigning is attractive. Furthermore, because
of the competitive environment, expected costs in period 2 are relatively high, making it attractive to
use period one spending to defuse competition and save on future costs. In such a situation “gambling
for resurrection” turns out to be a possible equilibrium. However, the popularity difference between
candidates must not be too large. To see why this is the case recall the aforementioned logic of strategic
substitutes and complements. A candidate’s investments are strategic substitutes if and only if he is in
expectation more popular than his opponent in stage 2 given equilibrium efforts. If this is not the case,
a marginal increase in spending decreases the expected popularity gap and hence increases expected
costs. Consequently, the trailing candidate may spend more in equilibrium, but if he does this he needs
to spend enough to turn the state in his favor in expectation. Of course, turning the state becomes
increasingly expensive as the difference between candidates increases, and there exists a threshold gap
determining the maximum lead that the trailing candidate may try to turn by investing heavily in
campaigning.
Obviously, if the trailing candidate can take charge and act aggressively in the campaign in equilib-
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Figure 2: Reaction functions for F (gray) and T (brown, dashed) and stage 1 equilibria for ρ = 0.242 and
a ∈ {0, 0.04, 0.1}.
rium, this is also possible for the front-runner. After all, it is cheaper for her to stay in the lead than
for her opponent to turn the electorate’s sentiment. Consequently, when ρ ≤ ρ¯ there exist multiple
equilibria.
It remains to discuss what happens when the race is tied. As before, to conjecture that there exists
a symmetric equilibrium is appealing. But we have also seen that there are multiple equilibria if no
candidate dominates. Those asymmetric equilibria also exist in the tied race. Hence, there exist three
equilibria for a = 0, and more generally, when a is small. However, note that the symmetric equilibrium
at a = 0 is asymptotically unstable, while the asymmetric equilibria are stable. In the next proposition
we summarize the results formally:
Proposition 4. If ρ is relatively small, ρ ≤ ρ¯, there may exist multiple equilibria. If we confine
ourselves to asymptotically stable equilibria, there exists no symmetric equilibrium, even for a = 0. In
close races either candidate may spend more in stage 1 in equilibrium, while if one candidate has a
sufficiently large advantage, this candidate outspends her opponent in stage 1 and the equilibrium is
unique.
Proof. See appendix.
Even though the two types of equilibria may look very different at first sight, they follow in fact the
same underlying logic. Candidates’ find it worthwhile to defuse competition in period 2 by investing
asymmetrically in period 1. One candidate takes a soft stance. She will suffer a lower probability
of success which will be more than compensated through the saved costs. The other candidate takes
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a tough stance and thus incurs high costs in period 1. He is more than compensated through the
increased probability of success and the cost savings in period 2. In order to illustrate the multiplicity
of equilibria in stage 1 graphically, we simulated the equilibria using the best response functions of the
candidates for ρ < ρ¯ and a ∈ {0, 0.04, 0.1}. They can be found in Figure 2. In panel a) the symmetric
case is depicted. In panel b) F has a small advantage, and thus multiple equilibria exist. In panel c)
there is a unique equilibrium exhibiting momentum.
Next consider the effect of polls on the election outcome. For the case of ρ ≤ ρ¯ we need to amend
Corollary 1 slightly.
Corollary 2. The effect of polls: If it is relatively inexpensive to change a close outcome in ex-
pectation, ρ < ρ¯, polls create momentum if there is a clear front-runner. Thus, polls increase the
probability that the front-runner is elected. In close races, momentum and anti-momentum may occur
and consequently the outcome of the election relative to a situation without polls is ambiguous.
Proof. This follows immediately from Propositions 1, 2 and 4.
A final comment concerning the equilibria when ρ ≤ ρ¯ is in order. A low value of ρ implies that
either marginal costs are low or the campaign is – to borrow from the theory of contests – relatively
discriminating (low σǫ), or both. Either makes it unlikely that an interior pure strategy equilibrium
exists, since the second order conditions are then likely to be violated. Typically there exists only
a small range of values for ρ ≤ ρ¯ for which the second order conditions hold. Figure 3 illustrates
combinations of c and σǫ for which pure-strategy equilibria as discussed above exist.
To sum up, there always exists an equilibrium where the front-runner outspends the trailing candi-
date and thus creates momentum. Furthermore, in close races when campaigning is relatively effective,
also the trailing candidate may outspend the front-runner. While in this section we compared relative
spending, in the next section we are interested in the effect of polls on candidates’ aggregate campaign
spending.
4 Polls and the intensity of political competition
So far we have focused on the effects of polls on the outcome of the election, which is determined through
relative candidate spending in the campaign. We have neglected the actual level of expenditures.
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Figure 3: Number of pure strategy equilibria in stage 1 depending on c and σǫ. In Region I there is a unique
equilibrium, in region II there are two stable equilibria in close races. In the region below II the second order
conditions do not hold for each possible popularity realization a and hence we cannot guarantee existence of pure
strategy equilibria.
Campaign expenditures can be quite substantial. For example, they typically exceed one billion U.S.
dollars in the case of presidential elections in the U.S. Thus, the “wastefulness of competition” is
also an important aspect to study and relate to the existence of polls. We are aware that not all
campaign efforts are necessarily wasteful since campaigns also inform voters about the candidates’
positions. Nevertheless, we define wastefulness as expected aggregate spending over the course of the
campaign. Thus, we implicitly assume that polls do not influence the level of informative campaigning
and candidates on the margin invest for example in image building activities. The following proposition
shows the result:
Proposition 5. Expected aggregate campaign expenditures are lower in the presence, than in the absence
of polls. Thus, ceteris paribus, polls make competition less wasteful.
Proof. See appendix.
Because polls create momentum (or anti-momentum), initial asymmetries are amplified. This de-
creases the expected intensity of competition in subsequent rounds, and hence expected wastefulness
decreases, too.11
11Of course, conducting polls will incur additional costs which need to be taken into consideration in a full-fledged
welfare analysis, here we only highlight the direct effect of polls on the intensity of competition.
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The effect of increased information on the intensity of competition has been a subject of interest
in other studies as well. A recent example is Denter, Morgan, and Sisak (2011), who analyze the
effect of mandatory disclosure requirements in competitive environments such as lobbying competition
and political campaigns. They study the competitors’ incentives to share private information about
their characteristics, for example their valuation of winning, and how mandated disclosure affects
the investment decision and outcome of competition. Their main result is that mandatory disclosure
increases the intensity and decreases allocative efficiency of competition in expectation. In their setting,
an uninformed player can use the chance of facing a weak opponent to appease a strong opponent, and
at the same time the threat to face a strong opponent to discourage a possible weak opponent. The
lack of information about the opponent helps to commit to strategies which would not be credible
under complete information. In contrast, in this paper, candidates are identical except for their current
popularity. There is no private information held by the candidates, and hence they can not use this
lack of knowledge as a commitment.
5 Polls and candidates’ spending profiles
In this section we take a closer look at the spending profiles of the candidates. Without polls the
result is straightforward, spending decreases as one candidate becomes more and more popular (in
expectation). In this section we focus on spending profiles given that polls are conducted. Because
comparative statics are only meaningful in settings with unique equilibria, we restrict ourselves to this
case. We compare our results with empirical findings and show that the model performs relatively well
in predicting spending profiles.
We know already from Section 3 that (given a unique equilibrium) polls always create momentum
and the more popular candidate invests more heavily in the campaign. We are now interested in how
the candidates’ spending varies in absolute terms as we increase the realized popularity advantage |a|
of the front-runner from zero. In stage 2 we observed that spending decreases monotonically in |d2|, i.e.
when one candidate’s becomes more and more popular with the electorate. Also in the studies of Snyder
(1989), Erikson and Palfrey (2000), or Klumpp and Polborn (2006) intensity of competition decreases
as candidates become increasingly asymmetric. However, in stage 1 we find a non-monotonic spending
profile for the front-runner. The reason is that compared to a symmetric race, the front-runner has an
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additional incentive to invest in stage 1 in order to reduce future competition. This also explains why
the trailing candidate’s spending profile is monotonically decreasing. Thus, we find that introducing
dynamics may change results significantly. The following proposition states the result:
Proposition 6. Assume ρ > ρ¯. Candidate F ’s expected total investment increases in a when a = 0,
while candidate T ’s expected total investment decreases.
Proof. See appendix.
The trailing candidate’s campaign spending decreases monotonically as |a| grows larger. His more
popular adversary, however, has an incentive to first increase spending when her lead grows larger,
before she also cuts down on spending when she becomes more and more advantaged in the campaign.
We can now describe the two candidates spending profiles completely:
Corollary 3. As |a| increases from zero the more popular candidate first increases spending in the
campaign and her spending declines only after she reaches a certain popularity advantage. The trailing
candidate monotonically decreases spending and spends less than his opponent for all |a| > 0.
How well does the model perform in predicting candidate spending in a campaign? In the left panel
of Figure 4 we plotted expected total campaign spending for both candidates for σǫ = 1 and c =
1
3 .
For a comparison we show in the right panel of Figure 4 the vote-on-spending effects as estimated by
Erikson and Palfrey (2000). Although our model is relatively simple it predicts the spending profile
surprisingly well. At a = 0, which represents a predicted incumbent vote of 50 percent, both candi-
dates choose identical spending. The incumbent’s spending increases first and decreases after peaking
at around 55 percent until the predicted incumbent vote reaches some 80-85 percent. Then, some-
what surprisingly, spending goes up again.12 The challenger’s spending decreases in the incumbent’s
popularity advantage and remains below the incumbent’s spending at all time.
6 Extending the basic model
In this section we discuss extensions to the basic model. We start off by showing that our results from
the previous section are qualitatively robust to more general functional specifications. Second we depart
12One reason for this upwards turn for a dominating front-runner might lie in her ability to attract funding. In our
model costs do not depend on popularity. When increased popularity makes fundraising easier and thus costs of investment
lower, an additional benefit of being a front-runner arises.
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Figure 4: Total spending per candidate, depending on popularity. The left panel shows the predictions of our
model (expected total spending) for σǫ = 1 and c =
1
3
. The right panel shows Figure 3 from Erikson and Palfrey
(2000), which shows candidate spending in the U.S.
from the assumption of pure maximization of the probability to win and consider candidates that are
also interested in the popular vote per se, as is for example the case in proportional representation (PR)
electoral systems. Third, we consider inaccurate polls. Finally, we discuss some further extensions.
6.1 Functional assumptions
For the baseline model we assumed normally distributed noise and quadratic costs. In this section we
show that our results generalize.
Consider the distribution of the macro shock ǫt first. While, as we argued above, the normality
assumption can be justified – for example by invoking the central limit theorem – it is nevertheless of
interest to explore the robustness of our results in more detail. Hence we relax this assumption and
assume the following instead:
Assumption 1. ǫ1 and ǫ2 are independently distributed on S1 ⊆ R and S2 ⊆ R with densities g1(ǫ1)
and g2(ǫ2). gt(ǫt) is differentiable on St, symmetric around zero and gt′(|ǫt|) ≤ 0.
By Assumption 1 each shock has a quasi-concave density, implying that a large shock is less likely
to occur than a small shock. Furthermore, noise is unbiased and thus it is unlikely to have a series of
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random events only in support of one of the two candidates, i.e. each candidate gains from some events
and loses from others in expectation. Distributions fulfilling Assumption 1 are for example the uniform
distribution or a symmetrically truncated normal distribution.
Now turn to the cost function. Instead of quadratic costs we assume the following:
Assumption 2. Spending on TV ads x implies costs C(x), where C(0) = 0, C ′(0) = 0, C ′ > 0 for all
x > 0, C ′′ > 0 and |C ′′′| is finite.
This cost function is strictly convex and hence may reflect both increasing marginal costs of fund
raising as well as diminishing marginal returns of campaigning. In any other respect, the campaign
game is as before.
Proposition 7. All results qualitatively resemble those of Section 3. If there is a unique equilibrium
(sufficient noise, C ′′(x) sufficiently large) polls always create momentum.
Proof. See appendix.
As before, if the macro shock’s variance is sufficiently large or if marginal costs increase sufficiently
fast, there is a unique equilibrium and polls create momentum. Otherwise, multiple equilibria may
exist and polls may create anti-momentum in close races.
An interesting feature of the more general model is worth noting: candidates may drop out of the
race by spending nothing. This could not happen in the baseline model since marginal costs of the first
TV ad published were zero and the marginal benefit of publishing TV ads was strictly positive due
to the infinite support of the normal distribution. This possibility can be best illustrated by letting
E[(ǫt)2] → 0 and assuming the quadratic cost function from the previous section.13 The campaign is
then a perfectly discriminating contest or – using the language of auction theory – an All-pay auction.14
Absent a poll both candidates publish an identical number of TV ads in stage t = 1, 2. If there is a poll,
there exists a unique equilibrium in stage 2. If |d2| <
√
2
c this equilibrium is in mixed strategies and
both candidates choose in expectation identical spending. Otherwise, the campaign is decided already
and both candidates spend nothing. In stage 1, for |a| <
√
2
c , there always exists a pure strategy
13The formal discussion can be found in Section G of the appendix.
14This form of contests has been studied extensively with applications ranging from lobbying contest (Hillman and Riley,
1989; Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries, 1993) to political campaigns (Meirowitz, 2008), revolution or war (Polborn, 2006)
and internal labor markets (Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001).
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equilibrium in which the leading candidate publishes TV ads and the trailing candidate stays passive
(for a ≥
√
2
c the front-runner is so far ahead, that it is strictly dominated for the trailing candidate to
spend anything, and thus there is no competition). In close races also the opposite – an equilibrium in
which the trailing candidate acts tough and spends a positive amount, while the front-runner remains
passive – exists. Hence, there are multiple pure strategy equilibria if the campaign is close in t = 1.
Consequently, in stage 1 the trailing candidates always drops out if his opponent is sufficiently popular.
In analogy to before, in close campaigns also the front-runner might drop out in equilibrium.
This discussion also confirms our previous findings for ρ < ρ¯ for the limit as ρ = 0. In close races,
multiple equilibria emerge, exhibiting momentum and anti-momentum. In general though, it is likely
to see the front-runner outspending the trailing candidate and thus the front-runner is more likely to
improve her position over time.
While we have shown that momentum is a robust characteristic of polls, can we say the same
about wastefulness? In Section 4, using our benchmark model, we have shown that polls make political
competition less wasteful because they introduce more asymmetries between the candidates. Next we
generalize Proposition 5 for more general noise and cost functions, but focusing on situations where a
unique equilibrium exists:
Proposition 8. Given assumptions 1 and 2 hold and a unique equilibrium exists. When C ′′′(x) ≥ 0
∀x, aggregate campaign expenditures decrease in expectation with the introduction of polls, strictly so
when | µα |> 0. For C ′′′(x) < 0 ∀x wastefulness may increase.
Proof. See appendix.
Thus, we find that the shape of the marginal cost function determines the effect of polls on waste-
fulness of competition. Note that if (but not only if) the spending elasticity of costs is decreasing in
x wastefulness always declines.15 This is in line with earlier findings by Aoyagi (2010), Ederer (2010)
as well as Gershkov and Perry (2009) regarding the effect of feedback in labor market tournaments.
To see why the shape of the cost function matters, consider second period investments. Investments
are symmetric and decreasing in popularity |d2|. The revelation of current relative standing reduces
the noisiness of the decision environment. Thus, when standing |d2| is close to zero, candidates’ incen-
tives to invest are increased by the reduction in noise. On the other hand, when relative popularity
15If this elasticity is decreasing C′′′(x) must be positive.
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|d2| is large, candidates’ incentives are diminished with a reduction in noise as the trailing candidate
then faces little chance of a “lucky break”. When marginal costs increase faster with higher spending,
or C ′′′(x) > 0, the latter effect is dominant and polls decrease wastefulness. In this case the differ-
ence in spending for relatively equal popularity is negligible because for high expenditures the effect
of increasing marginal costs kicks in the strongest. In contrast to Aoyagi (2010), Ederer (2010) and
Gershkov and Perry (2009) polls decrease wastefulness also for C ′′′ = 0 and even C ′′′ < 0 if sufficiently
close to zero because of the effect described in Section 4: Polls cause momentum for the front-runner
and thus amplify early asymmetries and defuse competition.
6.2 Concerns for vote share
In some situations candidates do not only care about winning the election, but also about the vote
share they receive. For example, a government that has only slightly more than 50 percent of the vote
share, might have difficulties in passing laws because some delegates might refuse to toe the party line.
Similarly, in proportional representation electoral systems the vote share is important.
Assume a candidate or party values winning the majority by λ ∈ [0, 1]. We can interpret this as a
plurality premium as in Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2013). In addition, candidates get utility si(1 − λ)
from gaining a share of si of the total popular vote. (1 − λ) measures the relative importance of the
vote share. For example, in many countries political parties receive financial subsidies in proportion to
their vote share. Increasing those subsidies would imply a higher (1 − λ). Similarly, the influence of
a normal member of parliament that is not part of the government may determine (1 − λ), too. The
benefit of candidate i in the election is hence
bi =

 λ+ si(1− λ) if si >
1
2 ,
si(1− λ) else.
As before, candidates maximize their expected benefit subject to costs of campaigning effort. Otherwise
we leave the model unchanged relative to Section 3. Candidates now care about the whole distribution
of voters, and not only the median voter. We assume that voters vote for the candidate that affords
them the highest expected utility as defined in equation (1), and candidates’ spending affects all voters
in the same way. Analogous to the median’s relative ex-ante candidate assessment α, αi is voter i’s
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relative assessment of the candidates. We assume the distribution of αi follows:
Assumption 3. For a given realization of the median ′a′, the distribution of voters’ candidate assess-
ments has density
p(αi, a) =
φ(
−µp−a+αi
σp
) + φ(
µp−a+αi
σp
)
2
,
where µp ≥ 0 and σp > 0.
p(αi, a) is a mixture distribution of two normals with identical standard deviation σp and means
−µp and µp. Hence, it is symmetric around a. It is easy to generalize the model to more flexible
distributions, but the additional insights gained from such a generalization are only marginal.16
There are two different effects at work that may lead to differential incentives: the effect of a
marginal change in spending on the winner-take-all part and the effect on the vote share part. We
already know how the first effect looks like: investments are decreasing in |d2| and thus there always
exist momentum equilibria. Hence, turn to the latter effect, caused by the proportionality of the
obtained rent and the vote share. In the second stage competition will be fiercest when the mass of
marginal/swing voters to be won over is largest, i.e. the distribution peaks at current popularity d2.
Thus, in stage 1 a candidate’s incentives to publish TV ads depend on whether this will bring him closer
in expectation to a position of fierce future competition. If the electorate is polarized, i.e. there is a
large mass of voters at the tails of the distribution, while only a small mass in the center, competition
is fiercest when candidates are not equally popular. Thus, in these cases the trailing candidate may
have an incentive to publish more ads in stage 1 than the front-runner as this will enable him to defuse
competition in the future.
Proposition 9. If candidates care sufficiently about vote share (λ is small) and the electorate is suffi-
ciently polarized (µp is large), there exist unique anti-momentum equilibria in close races.
Proof. See appendix.
Of course, even if the electorate is polarized, this does not yet mean that there is this kind of
anti-momentum, because – as before – also the probability to win the majority counts. Hence, if λ, the
16We could also allow for different variances of the two normal distributions. Then the distribution p(αi, a) is not
symmetric anymore. This would have an asymmetric effect on candidates that is not related to their standing in the race,
but to the particular distribution. Assuming symmetry allows us to identify effects due to relative standing.
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plurality premium, is relatively large, the results will be identical to those in the previous section no
matter what the distribution looks like:
Corollary 4. There always exists a λ < 1 such that all results remain as in Section 3. If µp ≤√
2σ2ǫ + σ
2
p this is generally the case, independent of λ.
Proof. See appendix.
What can we conclude from this? In FPTP systems it is unlikely that candidates value the vote
share more than the probability to win, and hence λ is likely to be large. But as we have seen, in
this case the results from Section 3 remain valid and momentum is likely to occur. However, in other
electoral systems results may differ. For example, in proportional representation electoral systems λ is
likely to be lower than under FPTP. Hence, if in such a system the electorate is polarized, the conditions
from Proposition 9 are more likely to apply and anti-momentum might be the unique outcome.
6.3 The precision of polls
We assumed that without a poll candidates receive no feedback about their relative standing with the
populace, while in the presence of polls they learn current popularity for sure. These were interesting
benchmark cases and served well to illustrate the relevant intuitions. We now extend our baseline model
to analyze imprecise polls to show that our results hold more generally.
Assume that instead of fully revealing current popularity, polls offer a noisy, though unbiased signal.
Let dt denote the result of the poll at time t. Note that in this extended model we have E
[
d1
]
= a
instead of d1 = a as well as E
[
d2
]
= a+ x1F − x1T instead of d2 = a+ x1F − x1T due to the imprecision
of the poll. Denote the error of the poll at t by ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η) for some ση ≥ 0.17
In order to focus on the effect of poll precision, assume now that σǫ → 0 and thus there are no
popularity shocks. Hence, any change in candidate evaluation is due to campaigning. Given that
candidates have the belief that the median is normally distributed with mean µα and variance σ
2
α, and
if the polling error is distributed as described above, the posterior belief after observing the poll at
17Note that as before we need ’sufficient’ noise to guarantee existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. We assume this to
be the case. But note that this extended model nests the all-pay case discussed in section 6.1 as a special case (σ2η = 0).
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t = 1 is still normal with updated mean
µ˜α(d
1) =
σ2αd
1 + σ2ηµα
σ2α + σ
2
η
and variance18
σ˜2α =
σ2ασ
2
η
σ2α + σ
2
η
.
When the poll becomes very imprecise, σ2η → +∞, candidates ignore the poll and beliefs remain
unchanged. This would correspond to our no-poll benchmark. On the other hand, when σ2η → 0
the prior is ignored and beliefs solely reflect the poll result. This corresponds to the All-pay auction
discussed in Section 6.1. Hence, we bridge the two models by allowing for imprecise polls. For t = 2
we get a posterior belief with mean
˜˜µα(d
2) =
σ˜2αd
2 + σ2ηµ˜α
σ˜2α + σ
2
η
and variance
˜˜σ2α =
σ˜2ασ
2
η
σ˜2α + σ
2
η
.
Considering the candidates’ investments in the second stage, we can simply replace the density of
the shock ǫt with the density of the posterior popularity belief in t = 2 with variance ˜˜σ2α. The reason
is that even though ǫt and ηt represent different types of uncertainty, they have the same effect with
respect to expected popularity in t = 3. ǫt represents uncertainty as to shifts in popularity between t
and t + 1, while ηt represents uncertainty as to actual popularity measured at t. Both translate into
uncertainty about popularity on election day and thus both have the same effect on behavior in t = 2.
The effect of imprecise polls on the spending decisions in stage 1 is slightly more complex, as before,
and works through an expected shift of the stage 2 belief distribution.
Proposition 10. Consider the extended model and assume marginal costs are sufficiently high such that
a unique pure strategy equilibrium exists. The first-period front-runner always outspends the trailing
candidate. Furthermore, when the first-period advantage of the front-runner, d1 is sufficiently small,
an increase in poll precision increases the spending gap between front-runner and trailing candidate. If
18See, for example, Casella and Berger (2002).
26
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
d1
x1F − x1T
Figure 5: The effect of a decrease of ση on x
1
F − x1T in the extended model for c = 2 and ση = 2/3 (brown dotted
line), ση = 1/2 (gray dashed line), and ση = 1/3 (solid black line). In close races more precise polls increase
the spending difference, while in very lopsided races the spending difference decreases as the poll becomes more
precise.
the front-runner’s advantage is quite large, increasing the precision of the poll decreases momentum as
the spending differential goes to zero.
Proof. See appendix.
Thus, we find that increasing the precision of a poll increases the difference in incentives between
front-runner and trailing candidate and thus amplifies the difference in spending x1F −x1T in close races.
In lopsided races the opposite is true. Figure 5 illustrates the result by example.
Intuitively, a front-runner in the poll at t = 1 can be more sure that she is indeed preferred by the
median voter, ceteris paribus, when the precision of polls increases. This has two effects. On the one
hand, she will be more likely to benefit from reduced expenditures in the future, giving her an extra
incentive to invest. On the other hand, when |d1| is large and thus the race seems very lopsided, both
candidates will be further discouraged from investing as they become more sure about their relative
standing. This latter effect can dominate and lead to a decrease in spending differences despite an
increase in poll precision. This is seen easiest by looking at the All-pay auction case discussed earlier.
When the front-runner’s advantage becomes too large no candidate invests in the campaign anymore
and hence the race is over before it starts.
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6.4 Costs of campaigning
We assumed that costs of campaigning effort are additive across periods. This implies that the candi-
dates’ expected costs of spending in the future do not (directly) depend on current expenditures and
vice versa. Thinking about costs of fund raising, one can easily imagine though that high expenditures
in early periods make it harder to raise money later (ceteris paribus). This would be the case if first the
most willing donors are targeted for donations. Then, in later periods, new, less willing donors have to
be convinced to contribute. We expect this to have a mitigating effect on the magnitude of momentum.
When thinking about whether to increase spending, the front-runner will trade off a decrease in future
competition with higher expected costs of raising funds.
On the other hand, it may also seem plausible that early success lowers (marginal) costs of raising
funds in the future. This would be the case when donors condition their donation on expected success
in the election, maybe because they are expecting the implementation of favorable policies from the
winner. Then investing early has an additional advantage in that it improves popularity in expectation
and thus lowers costs of fundraising. In such a case momentum will be amplified. Which effect is more
relevant is an empirical question.
Finally, we assumed that candidates are similar in their costs of raising funds. Thus, we abstract
away from any differences between candidates not related to their relative popularity. Adding asym-
metries, for example in ability or costs, will naturally lead to more asymmetric campaigning behavior.
The general intuition though should be preserved also in such a more general setting. The benefit
of our modeling assumption is being able to disentangle different effects that play a role in creating
momentum more clearly.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we explore the effect of opinion polls on candidates’ incentives to campaign and the final
election outcome. We find that when candidates mostly care about winning the election, polls generally
cause momentum for the front-runner. The reason is that the front-runner has an additional incentive
to invest in her campaign. By investing early it becomes more likely that she comes out ahead in the
poll in the future. This in turn defuses competition and thus she can save on campaigning expenditures
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closer to the election. In close campaigns, when campaigning is very effective, also the trailing candidate
may adopt a tough stance and outspend the leader. We show that those results are robust to functional
form assumptions or the extent to which random events influence the election outcome.
Whether polls also make competition more wasteful, on the other hand, depends on the shape of
the marginal cost function of campaigning expenditures. If raising additional money becomes more
expensive with the amount raised, polls generally lead to a decrease in expected spending in the
campaign and so decrease the expected intensity of the electoral competition.
As discussed, we show that momentum arises quite generally when candidates care mostly about
winning the election. In case candidates are mainly interested in their vote share and the electorate is
relatively polarized, the trailing candidate may have stronger incentives to campaign in relatively close
elections. Anti-momentum may be the unique equilibrium. Thus, we expect the effect of polls to differ
between countries with a FPTP system and countries with proportional representation and that in the
latter no general statement about momentum can be made.
An implication of the model is that given an incumbency advantage at the outset of the campaign,
polls are likely to foster this advantage and thus decrease the rate of turnover in political offices. Indeed,
the spending profile predicted by our model fits well with the estimated profiles in Erikson and Palfrey
(2000), who show that incumbents with an early popularity edge tend to improve their chances by
spending more than their opponents in the competition.
Our model shows that a ban on the publication of opinion polls, as many countries impose in the
pre-election period, will likely not eliminate all effects on voters. In particular, we have shown that there
exists an indirect effect of polls on candidates’ campaigning investments, which in turn influence voters’
decisions at the ballot, and which is still in place because candidates are still allowed to commission
polls in that period. Thus, a ban on the publication of polling results needs to be complemented with
a ban on campaigning if potential causes of momentum are to be eliminated.
In our model voters react only to expenditures of the candidates, not to their relative standing.
Other papers have argued that voters’ preferences may be influenced also by relative standing (e.g.
Hong and Konrad (1998) or Callander (2007)). Voters receive additional utility by voting for a can-
didate who is ahead in the polls. Thus, for given popularity levels and equal campaigning effort, the
advantage of the front-runner grows. In terms of our model this can be interpreted as an additional
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popularity dependent shift of the voter distribution in favor of the front-runner. Under this interpre-
tation of the “bandwagon” effect momentum still results. Thus, accounting for the bandwagon effect
only introduces further stickiness into our model and potentially intensifies momentum.
For future research it is interesting to empirically validate the results proposed by the theory. In
contrast to theories that focus on the direct effect of polls on voters, our theory has predictions regarding
candidates’ campaign expenditures. Another interesting direction for future research is to study how
polls influence donors’ decisions to contribute to the candidates’ campaigns. As Figure 4 shows, clear
front-runners have a significant spending advantage over trailing candidates which is not completely
captured by our model, but which we believe to be related to donors’ behavior.
Mathematical appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We prove the proposition assuming the more general model discussed in Section 6.1, which as a
special case nests the model discussed in Section 3.1. If there is no poll, candidates do not observe the
realization of ǫ1 nor investments and hence their information does not change between periods 1 and
2. Hence, they maximize
max
(x1F ,x
2
F )∈R2+
∫∞
−∞ G˜(a+ x
1
F + x
2
F − x1T − x2T ) 1σαφ
(
a−µα
σα
)
d a− C(x1F )−C(x2F ),
max
(x1T ,x
2
T )∈R2+
1− ∫∞−∞ G˜(a+ x1F + x2F − x1T − x2T ) 1σαφ
(
a−µα
σα
)
d a− C(x1T )− C(x2T ),
where G˜ is the cdf of the convolution g1 ∗ g2. The system of first order conditions is
∫ ∞
−∞
g˜(a+ x1F + x
2
F − x1T − x2T )
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
d a− C ′(xti) = 0,
i = F, T and t = 1, 2. It is easily observed that in any interior pure strategy equilibrium it must hold
that x1F = x
2
F = x
1
T = x
2
T = x
∗. In particular,
x∗ = C ′−1
(∫ ∞
−∞
g˜(a)
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
d a
)
.
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Note that corner solutions with any xti = 0 cannot be an equilibrium for unbounded densities g
i such
as the normal due to our assumption that C ′(0) = 0 and the fact that gi(a) > 0 for all a. The second
order conditions evaluated at x∗ are
∫ ∞
−∞
g˜′(a)
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
d a−C ′′
(
C ′−1
(∫ ∞
−∞
g˜(a)
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
d a
))
< 0
for F and
−
∫ ∞
−∞
g˜′(a)
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
d a− C ′′
(
C ′−1
(∫ ∞
−∞
g˜(a)
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
d a
))
< 0
for T . If C ′′(.) is sufficiently large relative to g˜′(.) the second order conditions hold for all a and hence
this is an equilibrium. We assume this to be the case. Note that if the variance of g1 and g2 vanishes,
the second order conditions always hold, as we show later in Appendix G. If the variance becomes very
large, the slope of g1 and g2 decreases and hence the second order conditions also always hold. For the
parameterized model in Section 3.1 the second order conditions hold if
c > |
∫ ∞
−∞
g˜′(a)
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
d a|.
For the remainder of the paper we assume C ′′ to be sufficiently large to guarantee the second order
conditions. Hence, the proof is complete and this also contributes to the proof of Proposition 7.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We again prove the proposition directly in the general version of Proposition 7.
Consider the subgame in stage 2 when there is a poll. In this case both candidates know the
median’s exact position in stage 2, d2. Candidates maximize
max
x2F∈R+
G2(d2 + x2F − x2T )− C(x2F ),
max
x2T∈R+
1−G2(d2 + x2F − x2T )−C(x2T ).
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First order conditions read
g2(d2 + x2F − x2T )− C ′(x2i ) = 0,
where i = F, T , and the assumption on C ′ guarantee that there exists a unique x2i fulfilling these. It is
immediately observed that – as without a poll – both candidates choose identical spending, x2F = x
2
T .
In particular,
x2F = x
2
T = x
∗∗(d2) = C ′−1(g2(d2)).
The second order condition for F is
g2′(d2)− C ′′(C ′−1(g2(d2))) < 0.
Since it must hold for all d2, if this holds for F it also holds for T . We assume this holds for all d2. The
problem each candidate faces is then continuous and concave and hence a pure strategy equilibrium
exists. In our parameterized example, if σǫ2 = 1 it must hold that c > 0.242. For the remainder of the
paper we focus on situations where C ′′ is sufficiently large to guarantee the second order conditions are
fulfilled.
This proves Proposition 2 and also contributes to the proof of Proposition 7.
C Proofs of Propositions 3, 4, and 7
Proof. The expected utility of F and T , conditional on being in state d2 in the second stage, is
EU∗F (d
2) = G2(d2) − C (C ′−1 (g2(d2))) ,
EU∗T (d
2) = (1−G2(d2)) − C (C ′−1 (g2(d2))) .
Note that d2 = a+ x1F − x1T − e1. Then we can write the optimization problem of the candidates as:
max
x1
F
≥0
∫
S1
G
2(a+ x1F − x
1
T − e
1)−C
(
C
′−1 (
g
2(a+ x1F − x
1
T − e
1)
))
g
1(e1)de1 − C(x1F ),
max
x1
T
≥0
∫
S1
(1−G2(a+ x1F − x
1
T − e
1))− C
(
C
′−1
(
g
2(a+ x1F − x
1
T − e
1)
))
g
1(e1)de1 −C(x1T ).
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Taking the derivative with respect to the respective own strategy yields
∫
S1
(
g2(·) −
[
C ′(C ′−1(·))∂C
′−1(·)
∂g2(·)
∂g2(·)
∂x1F
])
g1(e1) de1 − C ′(x1F ),∫
S1
(
g2(·) −
[
C ′(C ′−1(·))∂C
′−1(·)
∂g2(·)
∂g2(·)
∂x1T
])
g1(e1) de1 − C ′(x1T ).
Making use of the fact that C ′(C ′−1(z)) = z and ∂g2(·)/∂x1F = ∂g2(·)/∂a = −∂g2(·)/∂x1T these
equations simplify to
∫
S1
(
g2(·) −
[
g2(·)∂C
′−1(·)
∂g2(·)
∂g2(·)
∂a
])
g1(e1) de1 − C ′(x1F )∫
S1
(
g2(·) +
[
g2(·)∂C
′−1(·)
∂g2(·)
∂g2(·)
∂a
])
g1(e1) de1 − C ′(x1T )
Using ∂C ′−1(g2(·))/∂g2(·) = 1/(C ′′(C ′−1(g2(·))) and ∂g2(·)/∂a = g2′(·), and letting a+ x1F − x1T =: κ
we get
∫
S1
(
g2(κ− e1) −
[
g2(κ− e1)g2′(κ− e1)
C ′′(C ′−1(g2(κ− e1)))
])
g1(e1) de1 − C ′(x1F ), (C.1)∫
S1
(
g2(κ− e1) +
[
g2(κ− e1)g2′(κ− e1)
C ′′(C ′−1(g2(κ− e1)))
])
g1(e1) de1 − C ′(x1T ). (C.2)
Before we analyze the equilibrium in detail we now need to show that an equilibrium exists.
Lemma 1. If C ′′(x) > Γ(g1, g2) (defined below) a pure strategy equilibrium exists for all realizations a.
Proof. The second derivative of F ’s payoff function is
∫
S1
[
g2′(κ− e1)−
(
g2′(κ− e1)
C′′(x∗∗(·))
)2(
C′′(x∗∗(·)) − g
2′(κ− e1)C′′′(x∗∗(·))
C′′(x∗∗(·))
)
− g
2(κ− e1)g2′′(κ− e1)
C′′(x∗∗(·))
]
dG(e1) − C′′(x1F ).
To show strict concavity of the payoff function we need to show that this is strictly negative for all κ
and x1F . Consider
(
g2′(κ− e1)
C ′′(x∗∗(κ− e1))
)2(
C ′′(x∗∗(κ− e1))− g
2′(κ− e1)C ′′′(x∗∗(κ− e1))
C ′′(x∗∗(κ− e1))
)
. (C.3)
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Let the γ1 > 0 be the smallest value of C
′′ for which
γ21 > g
2′(κ− e1)C ′′′(x∗∗(κ− e1))
for all κ − e1. If the infimum of C ′′ is at least γ1 (C.3) is non-negative. Since C ′′′ is bounded by
Assumption 2 and because it follows from differentiability and quasi-concavity that g2′(κ − e1) is
bounded, too, there exists finite γ1 for which this is the case. Hence assume (C.3) is zero. If this is the
case and we can show that the second derivative is negative, this is even more so the case when (C.3)
is positive. Therefore, we are left with
∫
S1
[
g2′(κ− e1)− g
2(κ− e1)g2′′(κ− e1)
C ′′(x∗∗(·))
]
dG(e1)− C ′′(x1F ). (C.4)
From strict quasi-concavity of g2 it follows that the expectation is bounded. Hence, there exists γ2 > 0
such that if C ′′(x) > γ2 for all x, (C.4) is strictly negative. It follows that if C ′′(x) > Γ(g1, g2) :=
max{γ1, γ2} the second derivative is strictly negative and hence the problem is strictly concave. Thus,
assuming this holds, and since payoffs are continuous in x1F and x
2
T , existence of a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium follows from Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), which is due to Debreu (1952),
Fan (1952), and Glicksberg (1952).
Now let us go more into the details of the first order conditions to determine the properties an
equilibrium must have. For this purpose we need the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Let
ξ(κ) := Eǫ1
[
g2(κ− ǫ1)g2′(κ− ǫ1)
C ′′(C ′−1(g2(κ− ǫ1)))
]
.
Then ξ(0) = 0, ξ(+) < 0 and ξ(−) > 0.
Proof. Define
ω(κ) :=
g2(κ− ǫ1)g2′(κ− ǫ1)
C ′′(C ′−1(g2(κ− ǫ1))) ,
which is the function we want to take the expectation of. Now remember that by adding an arbitrary
constant k to the argument of a function, the graph of the function is shifted horizontally by −k.
Therefore, if g2(−ǫ1) is axis-symmetric across zero, g2(κ − ǫ1) is axis-symmetric across −κ. As a
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consequence, the same holds true also for functions of this function, like C ′−1(g2(κ−ǫ1)), C ′′(C ′−1(g2(κ−
ǫ1))), and g
2(κ−ǫ1)
C′′(C′−1(g2(κ−ǫ1))) . Because g
2(−ǫ1) is axis-symmetric across zero, its derivative is point-
symmetric across zero. By a similar argument as above it also holds that g2′(κ− ǫ1) is point-symmetric
across −κ. Therefore, it holds true that also the product of an axis-symmetric function across −κ and a
point-symmetric function across this point, in our case this function is ω(κ), is point-symmetric across
−κ.
We first show that ξ(0) = 0. Let f(z) be a function which is axis-symmetric across zero and let
h(z) be another function which is point-symmetric across zero. Both functions share the same support
K. Then, if we want to find ∫K f(z)h(z)dz, we can split the integral into two parts:
∫
K
f(z)h(z)dz =
∫
{z∈K:z≤0}
f(z)h(z)dz +
∫
{z∈K:z>0}
f(z)h(z)dz.
Because of the symmetry properties f(z) = f(−z) and h(z) = −h(−z) we can rewrite the second term
as ∫
{z∈K:z>0}
f(z)h(z)dz = −
∫
{z∈K:z≤0}
f(z)h(z)dz.
Using this substitution it is easily verified that
∫
K
f(z)h(z)dz =
∫
{z∈K:z≤0}
f(z)h(z)dz −
∫
{z∈K:z≤0}
f(z)h(z)dz = 0.
Now let f(z) = ω(·) and h(z) = g1(ǫ1) and observe that the integral we want to calculate is the
expectation of ω(·) and therefore equal to ξ(0) to complete this part of the proof.
Next, consider κ > 0. ω is shifted to the left and is point-symmetric across −κ. Now note two
things: First, to the left of −κ the values of ω are positive, to the rights the values are negative. Second,
for any shock e leading to a realization ω(κ − e) = m there exists exactly one other shock e′, which
leads to a realization ω(κ − e′) = −m and is an inversion of the former point at (−κ, 0). Moreover,
this holds true for any point in the graph of ω. Accordingly, we can define the whole graph as pairs
of inversion points. Now observe, that the probability of an outcome −m is always weakly larger than
the probability of outcome m for all m ≥ 0. To see this note that a shock generating m must be of
size −κ − c, while the shock generating −m must be −κ + c, for some constant c ≥ 0. But then the
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shock e that produces outcome m is in absolute value weakly larger than e′. As a consequence, because
shocks are distributed symmetrically around zero, the density at e′ is weakly larger than the density
at e, g2(e′) ≥ g2(e). Note that this must hold for all m, e and e′, and accordingly the expectation of ω
must be negative. From a similar argument it follows that the converse must hold if we assume κ < 0.
Hence the proof is complete.
Knowing now that a pure strategy equilibrium exists we focus on interior equilibria henceforth. In
Section 6.1 we also discuss the case when noise vanishes and the contest takes the form of a fully discrim-
inating All-pay auction. In this case there are only corner equilibria and the results are qualitatively
identical.
From (C.1) and (C.2) it follows that the first order conditions in an interior equilibrium are
∫
S1
(
g2(κ− e1) −
[
g2(κ− e1)g2′(κ− e1)
C ′′(C ′−1(g2(κ− e1)))
])
g1(e1) de1 − C ′(x1F ) = 0
and ∫
S1
(
g2(κ− e1) +
[
g2(κ− e1)g2′(κ− e1)
C ′′(C ′−1(g2(κ− e1)))
])
g1(e1) de1 − C ′(x1T ) = 0.
Simple manipulations reveal that equivalently the following must hold:
x1F = C
′−1
(∫
S1
(
g2(κ− e1) −
[
g2(κ− e1)g2′(κ− e1)
C ′′(C ′−1(g2(κ− e1)))
])
g1(e1) de1
)
x1T = C
′−1
(∫
S1
(
g2(κ− e1) +
[
g2(κ− e1)g2′(κ− e1)
C ′′(C ′−1(g2(κ− e1)))
])
g1(e1) de1
)
.
Using ∆1 = x1F − x1T , it follows that in equilibrium it must hold that
∆1 = Σ(∆1 + a) := C′
−1
(∫
S1
(
g2(∆1 + a− e1) −
[
g2(∆1 + a− e1)g2′(∆1 + a− e1)
C′′(C′−1(g2(∆1 + a − e1)))
])
g1(e1) de1
)
(C.5)
− C′−1
(∫
S1
(
g2(∆1 + a − e1) +
[
g2(∆1 + a− e1)g2′(∆1 + a − e1)
C′′(C′−1(g2(∆1 + a− e1)))
])
g1(e1) de1
)
.
The shape of this function is now important to determine equilibrium behavior. We now establish a
few lemmata that help us to characterize equilibria.
Lemma 3. Sign
[
Σ(∆1 + a)
]
= Sign[∆1 + a]. Moreover, Σ(∆1 + a) is continuous, bounded, point
symmetric at −a in ∆1, and lim|∆1|→∞Σ(∆1 + a) = 0.
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Proof. From C ′′ > 0 it follows that the inverse C ′−1 is increasing. This together with Lemma 2 directly
implies Σ(0) = 0, Σ(+) = (+), and Σ(−) = (−). For the symmetry properties look at a = 0 first. Then
we have that
C ′−1
(∫
S1
(
g2(∆1 − e1) −
[
g2(∆1 − e1)g2′(∆1 − e1)
C ′′(C ′−1(g2(∆1 − e1)))
])
g1(e1) de1
)
and
C ′−1
(∫
S1
(
g2(∆1 − e1) +
[
g2(∆1 − e1)g2′(∆1 − e1)
C ′′(C ′−1(g2(∆1 − e1)))
])
g1(e1) de1
)
are mirror images of each other (in ∆1) with the reflection axis being the vertical through zero. This fol-
lows from the first argument of C ′−1 being axis symmetric at zero and the second being point symmetric
at zero. Hence, the difference must be point symmetric at zero. Now note that by adding an arbitrary
constant – for example a – to the argument of a function, the function is shifted horizontally by −a.
Hence, Σ must be point symmetric at −a. Continuity and boundedness follow directly from all terms
and C ′−1 being continuous and bounded. That the limit vanishes follows from lim|x|→∞ g2(x)g2′(x) = 0,
which follows from quasi-concavity of g2. This proves the lemma.
Lemma 4. Assume a 6= 0 and let the investment of the more popular candidate in stage 1 be x1F and
the investment of his opponent be x1T . In any equilibrium it holds that
x1T /∈ (x1F , x1F + |a|).
Proof. To see this look at the first order conditions. Without loss of generality assume a > 0 and
also assume x1T ∈ (x1F , x1F + a). This implies κ > 0 and thus, by Lemma 2, ξ(κ) < 0. Hence, T ’s
investments are strategic complements, and F ’s strategic substitutes. If F ’s first order condition holds,
T ’s must be strictly negative and he hence would like to decrease investment. If T ’s first order condition
holds, F ’s must be strictly positive and he would like to increase investment. Hence, this cannot be an
equilibrium.
Lemma 5. Assume a 6= 0 and let the investment of the more popular candidate in stage 1 be x1F and
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the investment of his opponent be x1T . There exists d ≥ 0 such that if a > d the equilibrium in stage 1
is unique and x1F ≥ x1T .
Proof. This follows from Lemma 4 and the fact, that any investment greater than x¯ := C−1(1) is strictly
dominated. Thus, when a becomes larger and larger, outspending the leading candidate becomes too
expensive. The inequality is weak because we did not assume ǫ2 has full support and hence the race
might be decided if a is sufficiently large. If we assume ǫ2 has full support – S2 = R – the inequality is
strict because the leading candidate always spends positive amounts.
The derivative of Σ with respect to ∆1 is
∂Σ
∂∆1
=
Eǫ1
[
g2′(·)]− Eǫ1 [ (g2′(·))2C′′(C′−1(g(·))) + g2(·)g2′′(·)C′′(C′−1(g(·))) − g2(·)(g2′(·))2C′′′(C′−1(g(·)))(C′′(C′−1(g(·))))3
]
C ′′
(
C ′−1
(
Eǫ1
[(
g2(·)−
[
g2(·)g2′(·)
C′′(C′−1(g2(·)))
])])) (C.6)
−
Eǫ1
[
g2′(·)]+ Eǫ1 [ (g2′(·))2C′′(C′−1(g(·))) + g2(·)g2′′(·)C′′(C′−1(g(·))) − g2(·)(g2′(·))2C′′′(C′−1(g(·)))(C′′(C′−1(g(·))))3
]
C ′′
(
C ′−1
(
Eǫ1
[(
g2(·) +
[
g2(·)g2′(·)
C′′(C′−1(g2(·)))
])]))
The proposition we want to prove states that in close games there might be both equilibria in which
the leading candidate spends more and some in which the trailing candidate spends more, depending
on the distributions of ǫ1 and ǫ2 and the shape of the cost function. If one candidate has a sufficiently
large advantage, in all equilibria this candidate will spend weakly more. If the equilibrium is unique
for all a, in this equilibrium the leading candidate will always spend weakly more. A necessary and
sufficient condition for a unique equilibrium for all a is that Σ′(∆1) < 1 for all ∆1. To see this note that
if there are to be multiple equilibria, that is ∆1 = Σ(∆1) intersect more than once, then Σ must be
steeper than ∆1 somewhere. Starting from an intersection of the two functions, if the slope is strictly
smaller than 1 to the right of the intersection Σ is strictly smaller than ∆1, and to the left strictly
larger, and hence there cannot be another equilibrium. If, however, there is some region in which the
slope is larger than 1, there exists a shifting Σ in a way such that there are multiple equilibria. Hence,
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if and only if
∂Σ
∂∆1
=
Eǫ1
[
g2′(·)]− Eǫ1 [ (g2′(·))2C′′(C′−1(g(·))) + g2(·)g2′′(·)C′′(C′−1(g(·))) − g2(·)(g2 ′(·))2C′′′(C′−1(g(·)))(C′′(C′−1(g(·))))3
]
C ′′
(
C ′−1
(
Eǫ1
[(
g2(·)−
[
g2(·)g2′(·)
C′′(C′−1(g2(·)))
])])) (C.7)
−
Eǫ1
[
g2′(·)]+ Eǫ1 [ (g2′(·))2C′′(C′−1(g(·))) + g2(·)g2′′(·)C′′(C′−1(g(·))) − g2(·)(g2 ′(·))2C′′′(C′−1(g(·)))(C′′(C′−1(g(·))))3
]
C ′′
(
C ′−1
(
Eǫ1
[(
g2(·) +
[
g2(·)g2′(·)
C′′(C′−1(g2(·)))
])])) < 1
for all ∆1, there is a unique equilibrium. Note that the absolute value of the slope is strictly decreasing
in C ′′ (evaluated at the equilibrium). C ′′ enters only in the denominator of the condition and all the
other terms are bounded by assumption. Hence, if C ′′(x) is sufficiently large for all x the equilibrium
is unique for all a. For a = 0 the equilibrium is symmetric and ∆1 = 0. If we now increase a we
thereby shift Σ to the left, which, because of the fact that Σ(+) = (+) (see Lemma 3), implies that the
intersection is now where ∆1 > 0. This remains true for all a > 0, and the opposite is similarly true
for a < 0.
If
∂Σ
∂∆1
> 1
for some ∆1 there are multiple equilibria for some a. This follows from the discussion above. If this
is true for small |a| it is likely that either candidate might spend more in equilibrium. A sufficient
condition for such equilibria is that
∂Σ
∂∆1
|a=0 =
−2Eǫ1
[
(g2′(−ǫ1))2
C′′(C′−1(g(−ǫ1))) +
g2(−ǫ1)g2′′(−ǫ1)
C′′(C′−1(g(−ǫ1))) −
g2(·)(g2 ′(·))2C′′′(C′−1(g(·)))
(C′′(C′−1(g(·))))3
]
C ′′
(
C ′−1 (Eǫ1 [(g2(−ǫ1))])
) > 1.
This derivative is strictly positive (follows from Lemma 2). If C ′′ is sufficiently small the derivative
gets larger than 1. Then there is one equilibrium ∆1 = 0. Moreover, because Σ vanishes as |∆1| → ∞
(see Lemma 3) and Σ is continuous, it follows from the intermediate value theorem that there are at
least two more equilibria, one with ∆1 > 0 and one with ∆1 < 0. Because Σ is point symmetric in ∆1
at zero (see Lemma 3) the asymmetric equilibria are symmetric to each other. Note that this analysis
relies on the validity of the first-order conditions. We have shown though that when C ′′ gets too small
the second order conditions are violated. In the parameterized version below we show that equilibria
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with this property can exist.
From Lemma 5 it follows that in races with one dominant candidate this candidate will always
expend more in the campaign, or both spend zero.
Now go the specific example of a normal distribution with variance σ2ǫ and zero mean and a cost
function C(x) = c2x
2. The marginal cost function is then linear and the second derivative of the cost
function is c. Hence, Σ simplifies significantly:
Σ(∆1 + a) = −Eǫ1
[
2φ(∆
1+a−ǫ1
σǫ
)φ′(∆
1+a−ǫ1
σǫ
)
c2
]
=
(∆1 + a)e
−(∆1+a)2
3σ2ǫ√
27πc2σ4ǫ
. (C.8)
Now look at the shape of Σ. Since a only shifts the function horizontally, we assume a = 0 for now.
The derivative with respect to ∆1 is
(3σ2ǫ − 2(∆1)2)e
−(∆1)2
3σ2ǫ
9
√
3πc2σ6ǫ
. (C.9)
This is strictly positive for |∆1| <
√
3
2σǫ, negative for |∆1| >
√
3
2σǫ, and zero for |∆1| =
√
3
2σǫ. The
maximum of Σ = 1
3
√
2eπc2σ3ǫ
is attained at ∆1 =
√
3
2σǫ and the minimum of Σ = − 13√2eπc2σ3ǫ is attained
at ∆1 = −
√
3
2σǫ. Now look at the second derivative of Σ,
2∆1(2∆1 − 9σ2ǫ ))e
− (∆1)2
3σ2ǫ
27
√
3πc2σ8ǫ
.
This is strictly negative on [−∞,− 3√
2
σǫ) ∪ (0, 3√2σǫ), and hence the function is strictly concave in
this region, which also must include (and does) the maximum. Hence, Σ is strictly concave between
zero and the maximum, and decreases monotonically thereafter. Hence, if Σ′(∆1) ≤ 1, the slope is
strictly smaller than 1 (the slope of ∆1) for all ∆1 ≥ 0. Therefore, there exists a unique ∆1 fulfilling
∆1 = Σ(∆1) not only for a = 0, but for all a ∈ R. Using the condition Σ′(0) ≤ 1 we can derive the
lower bound on ρ for which a unique equilibrium exists in the benchmark model, ρ > ρ¯ = 1
33/4
√
π
. Thus,
for given σǫ the derivative becomes arbitrarily small at ∆
1 = 0 if we increase c, and hence there exists c˜
such that for all c > c˜ the slope is less than 1, and larger than 1 else. In Figure 6 we show two examples.
If the derivative at ∆1 = 0 is larger than 1 there exist multiple equilibria. Because Σ is strictly concave
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Figure 6: ∆1 (gray) and Σ(∆1 + a) (brown) for σǫ = .5 and c ∈ {1.1, 0.97}.
on [0,
√
3
2σǫ], and the derivative is zero at the end of this interval, it must become equal to 1 at some
∆1 ∈ [0,
√
3
2σǫ]. Denote this by ∆˜. If we increase a now from zero we thereby shift Σ to the left by
a. Hence, the two outer intersections of ∆1 and Σ move to the right (∆1 increases), while the inner
intersection moves to the left. Hence, there are two intersections converging to each other, the ones
where ∆1 < 0. At d˜ they converge to ∆˜, and hence there are only two equilibria left. If we increase a
now further this equilibrium vanishes and only one equilibrium remains, in which ∆1 > 0.
To complete the proof we now show by example that the second order condition can hold in both
stages when there are multiple equilibria in stage 1. The second order condition in stage 2 for F is
φ′(
d2
σǫ
)− c < 0,
and this must hold for all d2. The second derivative has a maximum if d2 = −σǫ, and if c > 1√2eπσ2ǫ ⇔
ρ > 1√
2eπ
this maximum is strictly negative and F ’s second order condition holds for all d2. Note that
this is then also guarantees T ’s second order condition since candidates are symmetric in d2. Moreover,
note that 1√
2eπ
< ρ¯ = 1
33/4
√
π
. Hence, if the second order condition holds marginally in stage 2, there
are multiple equilibria in stage 1.
Now look at stage 1. Assuming the second order condition in stage 2 holds marginally, the second
order condition in stage 1 is
−κe
− κ2
4σ2ǫ
4
√
πσ3ǫ
− 1√
2eπσ2ǫ
+
(3σ2ǫ − 2κ2)e
1
2
− κ2
3σ2ǫ
9
√
6πσ4ǫ
,
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Figure 7: Numerical calculations of F ’s second derivative in stage 1, assuming second order conditions in stage
2 hold marginally, c > 1√
2eπσ2ǫ
. Right panel: σǫ ∈ {1/4, 1/2, 1}.
where, as above, κ = ∆1 + a. This seems to be strictly negative for all (σǫ, κ), and is strictly negative
in all our numerical calculation, see Figure 7.
What is left to prove Proposition 4 is to show that no stable symmetric equilibrium exists when
ρ < ρ¯. In the following we show that the slope of each candidate’s best response function for a = 0,
evaluated at the symmetric intersection, is less than minus one.
Each candidate’s best response is implicitly defined by
BR1F (x
1
T ) = max
{
{x1F :
∫
S1
(
g2(x1F − x1T − e1) −
[
g2(x1F − x1T − e1)g2′(x1F − x1T − e1)
C′′(C′−1(g2(x1F − x1T − e1)))
])
g1(e1) de1 − C′(x1F ) = 0}, 0
}
,
BR1T (x
1
F ) = max
{
{x1T :
∫
S1
(
g2(x1F − x1T − e1) +
[
g2(x1F − x1T − e1)g2′(x1F − x1T − e1)
C′′(C′−1(g2(x1F − x1T − e1)))
])
g1(e1) de1 − C′(x1T ) = 0}, 0
}
.
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium with x1F = x
1
T , it follows from Lemma 2 that the indirect effect is
zero for both and hence
x1F = x
1
T = C
′−1(Eǫ1 [g
2(ǫ1)])
is an equilibrium. From the implicit function theorem it follows that the slope of the best responses is
∂BR1i (x
1
j )
∂x1j
=
Eǫ1
[(
g2′(ǫ1)
C′′(x∗∗(ǫ1))
)2 (
C′′(x∗∗(ǫ1)) − g2(ǫ1)C′′
′(x∗∗(ǫ1))
C′′(x∗∗(ǫ1))
)
+
g2(ǫ1)g2′′(ǫ1)
C′′(x∗∗(ǫ1))
]
Eǫ1
[(
g2′(ǫ1)
C′′(x∗∗(ǫ1))
)2 (
C′′(x∗∗(ǫ1))− g2(ǫ1)C′′′(x∗∗(ǫ1))
C′′(x∗∗(ǫ1))
)
+
g2(ǫ1)g2′′(ǫ1)
C′′(x∗∗(ǫ1))
]
+ C′′(C′−1(Eǫ1g
2(ǫ1)))
.
If this is smaller than minus 1 the equilibrium is unstable. Note that the denominator must be positive,
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because it is the negative of the second derivative in equilibrium, and this has to be negative in
equilibrium. This is the case whenever
−2Eǫ1
[(
g2′(ǫ1)
C ′′(x∗∗(ǫ1))
)2(
C ′′(x∗∗(ǫ1))− g
2(ǫ1)C ′′′(x∗∗(ǫ1))
C ′′(x∗∗(ǫ1))
)
+
g2(ǫ1)g2′′(ǫ1)
C ′′(x∗∗(ǫ1))
]
> C ′′(C ′−1(Eǫ1g
2(ǫ1))).
Hence, the cost function must be sufficiently convex but not too convex. Using the functional forms
assumed this simplifies to
−2Eǫ1
[(
φ′
(
ǫ1
σǫ
))2
+ φ
(
ǫ1
σǫ
)
φ′′
(
ǫ1
σǫ
)]
> c2,
which further simplifies to
ρ = cσ2ǫ < (3
3/4√π)−1 = ρ¯.
This is the condition for the existence of multiple equilibria in the game with quadratic costs and
normal shocks. Hence, whenever there are multiple equilibria in this game, there is no stable symmetric
equilibrium. This completes the proof.
The proofs in Appendix A and B complete the proof of Proposition 7.
D Proof of Propositions 5 and 8
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 1 we know that aggregate expenditures in the general model and
without a poll are equal to
4C
′−1
(∫ ∞
−∞
g˜(a)
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
d a
)
.
With a poll, second period expected aggregate expenditures are also symmetric and equal to
2
∫ ∞
−∞
(∫
S1
C
′−1(g2(d2))g1(e1) de1
)
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
da.
as the proof of Proposition 2 shows. In period 1 we unfortunately cannot generally get a closed form
solution for equilibrium investments with poll. So we need to take an indirect approach. Recall from
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the proof of Proposition 3 that the first-order conditions are given by
∫
S1
(
g2(d2) −
[
g2(d2)
∂C ′−1(g2(d2))
∂g2(d2)
∂g2(d2)
∂a
])
g1(e1) de1 − C ′ (x1F ) = 0∫
S1
(
g2(d2) +
[
g2(d2)
∂C ′−1(g2(d2))
∂g2(d2)
∂g2(d2)
∂a
])
g1(e1) de1 − C ′ (x1T ) = 0
where d2 = a+ x1F − x1T − e1. Aggregate spending in period 1 is thus implicitly defined by
X1(a) = C
′−1
(∫
S1
(
g2(d2) −
[
g2(d2)∂C
′−1(g2(d2))
∂g2(d2)
∂g2(d2)
∂a
])
g1(e1) de1
)
+C
′−1
(∫
S1
(
g2(d2) +
[
g2(d2)∂C
′−1(g2(d2))
∂g2(d2)
∂g2(d2)
∂a
])
g1(e1) de1
)
,
and expected aggregate stage 1 spending is
∫ ∞
−∞
X1(a)
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
da.
By Jensen’s inequality we know that if C ′′′(x) ≥ 0
C
′−1
(∫∞
−∞ g˜(a)
1
σα
φ
(
a−µα
σα
)
d a
)
≥ ∫∞−∞C ′−1 (∫S1 g2(a− e1)g1(e1) de1) 1σαφ
(
a−µα
σα
)
da
≥ ∫∞−∞ (∫S1 C ′−1(g2(a− e1))g1(e1) de1) 1σαφ
(
a−µα
σα
)
da.
This inequality is strict for C ′′′(x) > 0 and non-degenerate distribution functions. Furthermore, we
used the fact that g˜(a) is density of the sum of of ǫ1 and ǫ2 and thus the convolution of g1 and g2. The
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difference between expected aggregate investment with and without poll is equal to
∫ ∞
−∞
(
C
′−1
(∫
S1
(
g
2(d2)−Υ(d2)
)
g
1(e1)de1
)
+ C
′−1
(∫
S1
(
g
2(d2) + Υ(d2)
)
g
1(e1) de1
))
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
da
+2
∫ ∞
−∞
(∫
S1
C
′−1(g2(d2))g1(e1) de1
)
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
da− 4C
′−1
(∫ ∞
−∞
g˜(a)
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
d a
)
≤
∫ ∞
−∞
(
C
′−1
(∫
S1
(
g
2(d2)−Υ(d2)
)
g
1(e1)de1
)
+ C
′−1
(∫
S1
(
g
2(d2) + Υ(d2)
)
g
1(e1) de1
))
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
da
−2
∫ ∞
−∞
C
′−1
(∫
S1
g
2(a− e1)g1(e1) de1
)
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
da
+2
∫ ∞
−∞
(∫
S1
(
C
′−1(g2(d2))−C
′−1(g2(a− e1))
)
)g1(e1) de1
)
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
da
≤2
∫ ∞
−∞
(
C
′−1
(∫
S1
(
g
2(d2)
)
g
1(e1)de1
)
− C
′−1
(∫
S1
g
2(a− e1)g1(e1) de1
))
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
da
+2
∫ ∞
−∞
(∫
S1
(
C
′−1(g2(d2))−C
′−1(g2(a− e1))
)
)g1(e1) de1
)
1
σα
φ
(
a− µα
σα
)
da
< 0
where we denote Υ(d2) =
[
g2(d2)∂C
′−1(g2(d2))
∂g2(d2)
∂g2(d2)
∂a
]
for ease of exposition. The first two inequalities
follow from Jensen’s inequality and the fact that C
′−1 is a concave function. The last inequality
is strict because of the fact that Sign[a] = Sign[x1F − x1T ] (momentum) and thus for all a 6= 0,
|g2(d2)| < |g2(a− e1)| due to quasi-concavity and symmetry around zero of g2. Hence, for C ′′′(x) ≥ 0
polls always decrease expected aggregate spending.
Now consider again the benchmark model and a situation where there is anti-momentum. If in
an anti-momentum equilibrium it holds that |∆1| > |2a| we are done because then the above proof
establishes the result also for this case. From the first order conditions we know the difference in
investments is Σ as defined above in (C.8) and equals
Σ(∆1 + a) =
(∆1 + a)e
−(∆1+a)2
3σ2ǫ√
27πc2σ4ǫ
.
To find the maximum a for which multiple equilibria exist we take the derivative with respect to ∆1
and set it equal to 1:
Σ′(∆1 + a) =
e
− (∆1+a)2
3σǫ2
(
3σǫ
2 − 2(∆1 + a)2)
9
√
3πc2σǫ6
!
= 1.
The solution is not to be obtained in closed form, but can be expressed in terms of the Lambert W
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function. Let z = 32
√
3eπc2σ4ǫ and let W (z) be the solution of the Lambert equation
z =W (z)eW (z).
Because z > 0 there exists a unique solution to this problem and W ′(z) > 0. Hence, W (z) is bounded
from below by W and from above by W . The maximum value that z can take on is achieved exactly
when ρ = ρ¯, in which case z =
√
e/2 and henceW = 1/2. As the lower bound we can take the minimum
value of ρ for which the second order conditions in stage 2 hold, which is ρ = 1/(
√
2eπ). This yields
z = 34
√
3
e , in which case then W ≈ 0.485075. The solution to the above equation is
∆1 + a = ±σǫ
√
3
2
− 3W (z).
Note that since W (z) ≤ 12 the square root has a real solution. The value of Σ evaluated at this point is
Σ(a) = ±
σǫ
√
3
2 − 3W (z)
2W (z)
,
which by definition is the difference in investments at this point. We focus on a ≥ 0 without loss of
generality, implying that in both expressions above we have to take the one with a minus. Hence, we
can determine the maximum a for which anti-momentum can exist in this case:
a = −σǫ
√
3
2
− 3W (z) +
σǫ
√
3
2 − 3W (z)
2W (z)
= σǫ
√
3
2
− 3W (z)
(
1
2W (z)
− 1
)
≥ 0.
a is zero iff ρ = ρ¯, which must of course be the case. Conditional on ρ, a is linear in σǫ.
So what we need to show is that
∆1 :

∆1 =
(∆1 + a)e
−(∆1+a)2
3σ2ǫ√
27πc2σ4ǫ
| a ∈ [0, a] ∧ ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ]

 ≤ −2a.
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It is easy to show that at a this always holds,
Σ(a) + 2a = −
σǫ
√
3
2 − 3W (z)
2W (z)
+ 2

−σǫ
√
3
2
− 3W (z) +
σǫ
√
3
2 − 3W (z)
2W (z)


= σǫ


√
3
2 − 3W (z)
2W (z)
− 2
√
3
2
− 3W (z)


= σǫ
√
3
2
− 3W (z)
(
1
2W (z)
− 2
)
< 0
Remember that at this point the slope of Σ with respect to a is positive, it is one. Also remember
that the slope of Σ is strictly negative for all finite a /∈
[
−
√
3
2σǫ,
√
3
2σǫ
]
, zero at the boundaries of this
interval, and positive within. In other words, the set of values of a for which the slope is positive is
convex (see equation (C.9) and paragraph that follows it). If we can show that in the equilibrium to
which the anti-momentum converges as a→ 0 the slope is also positive, we have proven that, starting
at a = 0, in all anti-momentum equilibria, the larger a grows, the smaller becomes |∆1|. We know
already that for the largest a that admits anti-momentum equilibria |∆1| is large enough. Hence, if the
slope at the equilibrium at a = 0 is positive we proved the proposition (see also Figure 6). It is easily
verified that in this equilibrium |∆1| = √3
√
−σǫ2 log
(
3
√
3πc2σǫ4
)
, which is well defined since ρ ≤ ρ¯.
Using this expression in the derivative of Σ above yields
∂Σ
∂∆
|
a=0∧∆1=−√3
√
−σǫ2 log(3
√
3πc2σǫ4)
= 2 log
(
3
√
3πc2σǫ
4
)
+ 1,
which is positive for all ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ]. This proves the proposition.
E Proof of Proposition 6
Recall the candidates’ first order conditions in stage 1 are
∂π1F
∂x1F
= Eǫ1
[
φ(a+∆
1−ǫ1
σǫ
)
σǫ
]
−Eǫ1
[
φ(a+∆
1−ǫ1
σǫ
)φ′(a+∆
1−ǫ1
σǫ
)
c σ3ǫ
]
− c x1F != 0
∂π1T
∂x1T
= Eǫ1
[
φ(a+∆
1−ǫ1
σǫ
)
σǫ
]
+Eǫ1
[
φ(a+∆
1−ǫ1
σǫ
)φ′(a+∆
1−ǫ1
σǫ
)
c σ3ǫ
]
− c x1T != 0
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in symmetric equilibrium, where a = 0, it is then easily verified that x1F = x
1
T =
1
2
√
πcσǫ
. To see this
note that from Lemma 2 the second term in the first order conditions is zero. The first is simply the
expectation of the normal density and hence the convolution of two normal densities, and thus equals
Eǫ1
[
φ(a+∆
1−ǫ1
σǫ
)
σǫ
]
= 1
2
√
πσǫ
. Investment follows immediately.
Letting κ = a+∆1 − ǫ1, second order conditions are
∂2π1F
∂(x1F )
2
= Eǫ1
[
φ′( κ
σǫ
)
σ2ǫ
]
− Eǫ1
[
φ′( κ
σǫ
)2 + φ( κ
σǫ
)φ′′( κ
σǫ
)
c σ4ǫ
]
− c !< 0
∂2π1T
∂(x1T )
2
= −Eǫ1
[
φ′( κ
σǫ
)
σ2ǫ
]
− Eǫ1
[
φ′( κ
σǫ
)2 + φ( κ
σǫ
)φ′′( κ
σǫ
)
c σ4ǫ
]
− c !< 0
For comparative statics we totally differentiate the candidates’ FOCs:
(
∂2π1F
∂(x1F )
2
)
dx1F +
(
∂2π1F
∂x1F∂x
1
T
)
dx1T = −
(
∂2π1F
∂x1F∂a
)
da(
∂2π1T
∂x1F∂x
1
T
)
dx1F +
(
∂2π1T
∂(x1T )
2
)
dx1T = −
(
∂2π1T
∂x1T∂a
)
da
Evaluating this in the symmetric equilibrium, where a = 0 and x1F = x
1
T =
1
2
√
πcσǫ
, we can express the
total differential in matrix notation. Defining
M =


∂2π1F
∂(x1F )
2
∂2π1F
∂x1F ∂x
1
T
∂2π1T
∂x1F ∂x
1
T
∂2π1T
∂(x1T )
2

 =

 16√3cπσ4ǫ − c − 16√3cπσ4ǫ
− 1
6
√
3cπσ4ǫ
1
6
√
3cπσ4ǫ
− c


P =

 −
∂2π1F
∂x1F ∂a
− ∂2π1T
∂x1T ∂a

 =

 − 16√3cπσ4ǫ
1
6
√
3cπσ4ǫ


dx =

 dx1F
dx1T


we can rewrite the total differential as
M · dx = Pda
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We apply Cramer’s rule for comparative statics. Let
MF =

 − 16√3cπσ4ǫ − 16√3cπσ4ǫ
1
6
√
3cπσ4ǫ
1
6
√
3cπσ4ǫ
− c


and
MT =

 16√3cπσ4ǫ − c − 16√3cπσ4ǫ
− 1
6
√
3cπσ4ǫ
1
6
√
3cπσ4ǫ

 .
The derivative we are searching for is then
∂x1F
∂a =
|MF |
|M | and
∂x1T
∂a =
|MT |
|M | , or
∂x1F
∂a
|a=0 = 1
6
√
3πc2σ4ǫ − 2
(E.1)
∂x1T
∂a
|a=0 = − 1
6
√
3πc2σ4ǫ − 2
(E.2)
∂x1F
∂a is positive iff cσ
2
ǫ > (3
3/4√π)−1 ⇔ ρ > ρ¯, and ∂x1T∂a is then negative. Expected investment in stage
2 is
Ex2(κ) = Eǫ1
[
1
σǫc
φ
(
a+ x1F − x1T − ǫ1
σǫ
)]
=
e
− (a+x
1
F−x
1
T )
2
4σ2ǫ
2
√
πcσǫ
=
e
− κ2
4σ2ǫ
2
√
πcσǫ
.
The derivative of this expected investment with respect to κ is
∂Ex2
∂κ
= − κe
− κ2
4σ2ǫ
4
√
πcσ3ǫ
which, if we evaluate this at the symmetric equilibrium at a = 0, is equal to zero. Hence, marginally
changing a only has an effect on stage 1 spending but no effect on spending in stage 2. Hence, expected
total investment of F is increasing in a when a = 0 and T ’s expected total investment decreases. This
proves the proposition.
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F Proof of Corollary 3
The derivative of the candidates’ equilibrium spending, derived using Cramer’s rule as above, is
∂x1F
∂a
=
27
√
πcσ3ǫ (a+ x
1
F − x1T )e
6x1T (a+x
1
F )+(a+x
1
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We proceed as follows. First we show that the denominator is strictly negative. Then we show that for
T the numerator is strictly positive. Finally, we show that for F the numerator is negative for small a
and positive thereafter. To do all this we make the following transformations: c = t
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t > 1 and we let κ = a+ x1F + x
1
T > 0 for all a > 0 in the following where applicable:
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Look at the denominator, which is identical for both, first and assume it is negative:
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It is easy to see that the last line must be true. The left side is decreasing in κ. At κ = 0 in the
symmetric equilibrium the inequality also holds. Hence, it holds generally.
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Now look at the numerator of T and assume it is positive:
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Note that the last line always holds when
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m ≤ 1 implies −4(m2 − 1) ≥ 0, and hence this must be strictly positive and the inequality must
holds. Together with the negative denominator this consequently implies T ’s investment decreases
monotonically in a, proving one part of the corollary.
Finally, consider the numerator of F .
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It is immediately observed that the LHS is zero for κ = 0, monotonically increasing in κ, and reaching
infinity as κ → +∞. Hence, iff κ is large the inequality holds. In addition, there exists a unique
κ¯ for which the LHS equals the RHS and for all smaller values the LHS is smaller. Because the
denominator is negative this yields that F ’s spending increases first, reaches a maximum and declines
then monotonically. Together with Proposition 6 this completes the proof.
G All-pay auction
Consider the example when E[(ǫt)2] → 0. Also consider the situation without a poll first. In this
situation the candidates do not know the median’s exact ranking but have beliefs F (α). For candidate
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F the probability to win the race is
Pr[x1F + x
2
F + a− x1T − x2T > 0] = Pr[a > x1T + x2T − x1F − x2F ] = 1− F (x1T + x2T − x1F − x2F ),
and similarly for T we get F (x1T + x
2
T − x1F − x2F ). Hence, we may write the candidates objectives as
max(x1F ,x
2
F )∈R2+ 1− F (x
1
T + x
2
T − x1F − x2F )− C(x1F )− C(x2F ),
max(x1T ,x
2
T )∈R2+ F (x
1
T + x
2
T − x1F − x2F )− C(x1T )− C(x2T ).
The corresponding first order condition for i in t reads
f(x1T + x
2
T − x1F − x2F )− C ′(xti) != 0.
This is identical for all t = 1, 2 and i = F, T . Hence,
xtF = C
′−1(f(0)).
For this to be an equilibrium the second order conditions need to hold:
f ′(0)− C ′′(C ′−1(f(0))) ≤ 0.
If costs are sufficiently convex and / or the variance of beliefs is sufficiently large this inequality holds
generally.
Now look at the case of a campaign with polls. Candidates have perfect knowledge of the median’s
ranking, and since there is no shock, there is no exogenous noise left. Consider stage 2 first, and assume
without loss of generality d2 ≥ 0. It is easily shown that there cannot be a pure strategy equilibrium
in this stage (see e.g. Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) or Hillman and Riley (1989)). The stage game is
similar to the game analyzed in Meirowitz (2008) with the difference that we have strictly convex
costs instead of linear cost functions. Let x¯ := C−1(1), the maximum investment that is not strictly
dominated. Moreover, let Qi(x
2
i ) be candidate i’s mixed strategy with support Si, i = F, T . Then stage
2 equilibrium is given by
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Figure 8: Investment distribution functions for the leader (dashed) and his opponent (solid). We assumed d2 = 3
10
and in the left panel c = 1, while in the right c = 7.
Proposition 11. Without loss of generality, let d2 ≥ 0. There is a unique equilibrium in mixed
strategies if d2 < x¯ with SF = [0, x¯− d2] and ST = {0} ∪ [d2, x¯]. Candidate F randomizes according to
QF (x
2
F ) =


0 if xF < 0,
C(d2 + xF ) if xF ∈ [0, x¯− d2],
1 if xF > x¯− d2,
while T ’s mixed strategy is given by
QT (x
2
T ) =


0 if xT < 0,
1− C(x¯− d2) if xT ∈ [0, d2],
1− C(x¯− d2) + C(xT − d2) if xT ∈ [d2, x¯],
1 if xT > x¯.
Expected utilities are 1 − C(x¯ − d2) for F and 0 for T . If d2 ≥ x¯ both candidates expend zero, x2F =
x2T = 0, and expected utilities are 1 and 0 respectively.
Proof. First we show that this is an equilibrium. Consider F choosing investment x ∈ [0, x¯ − d2]. The
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associated payoff is then
Pr[x+ d2 > x2T ]− C(x) = QT (x+ d2)− C(x) = 1− C(x¯− d2) + C(x+ d2 − d2)− C(x)
= 1− C(x¯− d2) + C(x)− C(x) = 1− C(x¯− d2).
He is hence indifferent between all pure strategies in SF given QT . Note also, that x > x¯ − d2 is
strictly dominated since lowering investment to x¯ − d2 saves costs without altering the probability to
win. Hence, given QT F is indifferent between all pure strategies in SF and cannot improve on the
expected payoff by deviating. Now consider T . Given QF , choosing x ∈ ST gives the following payoff:
Pr[x > x2F + d
2]− C(x) = Pr[x− d2 > x2F ]− C(x) = QF (x− d2)− C(x)
= C(d2 + x− d2)− C(x) = C(x)− C(x) = 0.
Investment x = 0 never wins but does not imply costs, either. All investments x ∈ [0, d2] are strictly
dominated since they cannot win but imply costs. Choosing investment x ∈ [d2, x¯] also yields zero
payoff, since the probability to win exactly equals the associated investment costs. Hence, all x ∈ SB
yield zero expected payoff. Note that deviating to x > x¯ is strictly dominated, since it would win for
sure but imply costs that are greater than the value of winning. Hence, there is no beneficial deviation
for T as well and thus QF and QT are an equilibrium.
Now consider the support SF . By elimination of strictly dominated strategies it is apparent that F
will never choose investment greater than x¯− d2, because T will never choose investment greater than
x¯. The maximum bid neither can be lower, because than T would have a winning strategy and could
simply overbid F and win for sure. That F ’s minimum bid must be zero and that the support cannot
have holes, or that it must be convex, follows directly from the proof in Hillman and Riley (1989).
Hence, SF is the only support a mixed strategy of F can have in equilibrium. Now consider ST . It is
apparent that all x ∈ (0, d2) can never win but imply positive costs, and are hence strictly dominated.
The maximum possible bid is naturally x¯, and must also be x¯. Otherwise F could overbid x2T and win
for sure. Convexity of ST follows again from Hillman and Riley (1989).
It is now easy to see that given SF and ST there do not exist other investment distribution making
the opponent indifferent between all investment in his mixed strategy. Hence, the proof is complete.
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To see which candidate has stronger incentives to invest we now need to calculate the expected
investment of each. We resort to the quadratic form employed before, where C(x) = c2x
2. Candidate
F ’s expected investment in the campaign is
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Similarly, for candidate T we get
Ex2T =
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Hence, the expected difference in investments is zero:
Corollary 5. The difference in expected investments in stage 2 is equal to zero.
This resembles our findings from a campaign with exogenous noise.
Now look at stage 1. We focus on pure strategy equilibria. Assume a ≥ 0 and x1T = 0. F chooses
investment to maximize
1−C(x¯− d2)− C(x1F ) = 1− C(x¯− a− x1F )− C(x1F ).
His first order condition reads
C ′(x¯− a− x1F )− C ′(x1F ) = 0⇔ x¯− a = 2x1F .
The equivalence in the last step follows from the strict convexity of C(.), due to which C ′(.) is strictly
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increasing. Because the second derivative is strictly negative,
−C ′′(x¯− a− x1F )− C ′′(x1F ) < 0,
we can use the first order condition to find the global maximum. F ’s optimal reaction to x1T = 0 is
x∗F =
x¯− a
2
.
(Note that for this to make sense we need that |a| < x¯. Otherwise no candidate has any incentive
to invest in their campaign.) Now turn to T . He either spends zero and gets zero in expectation or
maximizes
1− C
(
3
2
x¯+
1
2
a− x1T
)
− C(x1T ).
The first order condition reads
C ′(
3
2
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a− x˜1T ) = C ′(x˜1T )⇔ 2x˜T =
3
2
x¯+
1
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and hence
x˜T =
3
4
x¯+
a
4
.
The second order condition holds, but note that we only looked at positive investment. For this to be
optimal it needs to hold in addition that expected utility is weakly positive:
1− 2C
(
3
4
x¯+
a
4
)
≥ 0.
This inequality could in principle hold for small a, depending on the curvature of the costs function
and when a is relatively small. For concreteness, however, we stick to the functional employed mostly
in the paper, C(x) = c2x
2. Then
1− 2C
(
3
4
x¯+
a
4
)
= 1− c
(
3
4
√
2
c
+
a
4
)2
< 0.
To see this note that the second term is strictly increasing in a. Hence, if utility is negative for a = 0
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Figure 9: Combinations of c (horizontal) and a (vertical) admitting a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which
F spends more.
this is true also for all a > 0. Using a = 0 we get
1− c
(
3
4
√
2
c
+
a
4
)2
= 1− c
(
3
4
√
2
c
)2
= 1− 9
8
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8
< 0.
Hence, x˜T cannot be an optimal choice and T chooses zero investment instead. Therefore, we established
that this is an equilibrium. Moreover, note that as long as the utility from spending x˜1T is negative,
(x∗F , 0) is an equilibrium. This is the case for all
a ≥ 4− 3
√
2√
c
< 0.
Hence, as before when E[(ǫ)2] 6= 0, it may also be the case that the trailing candidate spends more. In
Figure 9 we show combinations of c and a for which there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in
which F spends x1F > 0 while T stays passive.
Note that by symmetry the whole analysis also applies for T if a ≤ 0. Hence, there always exists
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in stage 1 if we assume costs to be quadratic, and there are multiple
pure strategy equilibria in close enough games:
Proposition 12. In stage 1 of the competition with quadratic costs there always exists a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. In a close race there may also exist multiple equilibria, and either candidate may
adopt a tough stance and spend more. If one candidate has a relatively large advantage, this candidate
will also choose larger investment.
Proof. This follows immediately from the discussion above.
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It follows from Corollary 5 and Proposition 12 that the campaign game qualitatively perfectly
resembles what we have seen before in the case of a noisy competition. This proves the example.
H Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. To show existence of equilibrium we can proceed as before. To save on space we do not show the
proof (available upon request) but note that, as before, if c is large enough in any stage the candidates’
problems are strictly concave with continuous payoff functions and compact strategy spaces [0,
√
2
c ],
and hence equilibrium existence follows from standard proofs.
First we replicate the result of the benchmark model without polls. Candidates maximize
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respectively. Taking first derivatives with respect to spending in t leads to
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It is apparent that in any interior equilibrium both choose identical investments in both stages. More-
over, since investments perfectly cancel out, the equilibrium must be unique.
Now consider the situation with polls. For the stage 1 analysis we need an expression of the second
stage investment. Noticing that the noise structure changes since only one random term is remaining,
and that candidates now know d2 precisely, from the FOCs is follows that
x2F = x
2
T = x
2 =
λ
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c
.
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Making use of Assumption 3, we find
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Differentiation with respect to d2 gives
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At d2 = 0 the derivative is clearly zero. We hence take the second derivative to see the curvature:
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At d2 = 0 we get
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The first term is strictly negative, implying the derivative ∂x
2
∂d2
decreases and so does investment as we
increase |d2| from zero. Hence look at the second term. It is straightforward to verify that
Sign

φ′′

 µp√
σ2ǫ + σ
2
p



 = Sign [µp −√σ2ǫ + σ2p] .
It follows that µp >
√
σ2ǫ + σ
2
p is necessary for investment to be increasing in d
2. It is, however, not
sufficient. It is clear that when λ becomes large, the first term dominates and the sign of the second
derivative must be positive. However, if λ is small, that is if the plurality premium is very important,
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the second term dominates.
It is apparent from the discussion that for too small µp incentives are as under FPTP. However,
if µp >
√
σ2ǫ + σ
2
p stage 2 investments increase over some range in |d2|. It is easily verified that when
µp = µp =
√
3
√
σ2ǫ + σ
2
p the second derivative of second stage investment with respect to d
2 has its
maximum. It is easily shown that comparative statics ∂x1F /∂a at a = 0, in case a unique equilibrium
exists, are negative if µp = µp and if λ is small (available upon request). Hence, in this region there is
always anti-momentum in close games.
I Proof of Corollary 4
Proof. We know already from before that the comparative statics in stage 2 drive stage 1 behavior. To
prove the corollary it is hence sufficient to show that second stage investment is weakly decreasing in |d2|.
Note that there are two parts that determine the slope of investment, the marginal winning probability
and the marginal share. The first is always decreasing. Hence, if the second is also decreasing the
result holds. It is easily shown that for µp ≤
√
σ2ǫ + σ
2
p this must always be true. Note that this does
not mean the electorate is not divided. There are still two peaks of the preference distribution, but in
expectation the distribution in stage 3 becomes single peaked. Reasoning from stage 1 the condition
modifies to µp ≤
√
2σ2ǫ + σ
2
p, because the variance due to noise exactly doubles. That this is sufficient
for momentum follows basically from Proposition 7. If this condition does not hold comparative statics
may be different and anti-momentum might exist. However, there always exist a λ < 1 for which there
is strict momentum. To see this differentiate the investment in the second stage with respect to d2:
∂x2
∂d2
=
λ
σ2ǫ
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d2
σǫ
)
+ (1−λ)σ2ǫ+σ2p
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−µp+d
2√
σ2ǫ+σ
2
p
)
+φ′
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µp+d
2√
σ2ǫ+σ
2
p
)
2
c
.
As discussed above the first term is strictly negative, but the second may be positive as well. However,
since all functions are bounded for all d2 there exist a λ < 1 for which this is strictly negative, also in
expectation.
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J Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. We start solving the game from the end. Expected utility of F and T before exerting effort in
stage 2 equals
π2F = Φ
(
˜˜µα+x2F−x2T
˜˜σα
)
− c2 (x2F )2
π2T = 1− Φ
(
˜˜µα+x2F−x2T
˜˜σα
)
− c2(x2T )2
From a similar reasoning as before we can show that equilibrium efforts are identical for both and equal
to
x∗∗ =
φ
(
˜˜µα
˜˜σα
)
c
.
Effort depends on the belief about the relative standing, which was influenced by the earlier polls as
well as the prior belief. Expected utility in equilibrium is
π2F = Φ
(
˜˜µα
˜˜σα
)
−
(
φ
(
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˜˜σα
))2
2c
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(
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))2
2c
Substituting
˜˜µα =
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2
η + d
2σ˜2α
σ˜2α + σ
2
η
and
˜˜σα =
σ2ησ˜
2
α
σ˜2α + σ
2
η
and taking the expectation over d2 yields the expectation over stage 2 expected utility from the point
of view of stage 1:19
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19As in the baseline model we assume that investment is not observable to the candidates and it is thus not used to
update the prior beliefs. On the other hand, the candidates do anticipate the effect of their investments on the distribution
of the poll signal. We chose to present this specification because it encompasses the no-poll benchmark and the All-Pay
auction case as the limiting cases. Our results are robust to assuming that investments are observable and are thus used
by the candidates to update their prior beliefs. An appendix with details is available from the authors upon request.
61
This can be shown to be
π1F = Φ

 µ˜α (σ˜2α + σ2η)+ σ˜2α(x1F − x1T )
σ˜αση
√
2σ˜2α + σ
2
η

− 1
2
− e
−
µ˜2α(σ˜4α+σ˜2ασ2η+2σ4η)
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+2µ˜α(x
1
F−x
1
T )+(x
1
F−x
1
T )
2
2σ2η
4πcσ˜2ασ
2
η
×


(σ˜2α+σ2η)
3/2
e
σ2η(σ˜2α+σ2η)
(
µ˜α+x
1
F−x
1
T
σ2η
−
2µ˜α
σ˜2α+σ
2
η
)2
2(3σ˜2α+σ2η)√
3σ˜2α+σ
2
η
− 2πcσ˜2ασ2ηe
µ˜2α(σ˜4α+σ˜2ασ2η+2σ4η)
σ˜2α(σ˜2α+σ2η)
+2µ˜α(x
1
F−x
1
T )+(x
1
F−x
1
T )
2
2σ2η


− c2 (x1F )2
π1T = −Φ

 µ˜α (σ˜2α + σ2η)+ σ˜2α(x1F − x1T )
σ˜αση
√
2σ˜2α + σ
2
η

− e−
µ˜2α(σ˜4α+σ˜2ασ2η+2σ4η)
σ˜2α(σ˜2α+σ2η)
+2µ˜α(x
1
F−x
1
T )+(x
1
F−x
1
T )
2
2σ2η
4πcσ˜2ασ
2
η
×


(σ˜2α+σ2η)
3/2
e
σ2η(σ˜2α+σ2η)
(
µ˜α+x
1
F−x
1
T
σ2η
−
2µ˜α
σ˜2α+σ
2
η
)2
2(3σ˜2α+σ2η)√
3σ˜2α+σ
2
η
− 4πcσ˜2ασ2ηe
µ˜2α(σ˜4α+σ˜2ασ2η+2σ4η)
σ˜2α(σ˜2α+σ2η)
+2µ˜α(x
1
F−x
1
T )+(x
1
F−x
1
T )
2
2σ2η


− c2 (x1T )2
The first order conditions evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium at µ˜α = 0 are
∂π1F
∂x1F
|µ˜α=0 =
σ˜α√
2πση
√
2σ˜2α + σ
2
η
− cx1F
!
= 0
∂π1T
∂x1T
|µ˜α=0 =
σ˜α√
2πση
√
2σ˜2α + σ
2
η
− cx1T
!
= 0
and equilibrium efforts at µ˜α = 0 are thus
x1F = x
1
T =
σ˜α√
2πση
√
2σ˜2α + σ
2
ηc
.
It is easily shown that iff the slope at the symmetric equilibrium at µ˜α = 0 is less than one there is a
unique equilibrium and there are multiple equilibria else.
As before, for comparative statics we totally differentiate the candidates’ FOCs (which are omitted
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here; they can be easily reproduced for example with Mathematica):
(
∂2π1F
∂(x1F )
2
)
dx1F +
(
∂2π1F
∂x1F∂x
1
T
)
dx1T = −
(
∂2π1F
∂x1F∂µ˜α
)
dµ˜α(
∂2π1T
∂x1F∂x
1
T
)
dx1F +
(
∂2π1T
∂(x1T )
2
)
dx1T = −
(
∂2π1T
∂x1T∂µ˜α
)
dµ˜α
We express the total differential in matrix notation. Defining
M =


∂2π1F
∂(x1F )
2
∂2π1F
∂x1F ∂x
1
T
∂2π1T
∂x1F ∂x
1
T
∂2π1T
∂(x1T )
2

 ,
where
∂2π1F
∂(x1F )
2 =
(
√
σ˜2α+σ
2
η−6c2πσ4η
√
3σ˜2α+σ
2
η)σ˜2α+σ2η(
√
σ˜2α+σ
2
η−2c2πσ4η
√
3σ˜2α+σ
2
η)
2cπσ4η(3σ˜2α+σ2η)
3/2 ,
∂2π1F
∂x1F ∂x
1
T
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(
σ˜2α+σ
2
η
3σ˜2α+σ
2
η
)3/2
2cπσ4η
,
∂2π1T
∂x1F ∂x
1
T
= −
(
σ˜2α+σ
2
η
3σ˜2α+σ
2
η
)3/2
2cπσ4η
,
∂2π1T
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2 =
(
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2
η−6c2πσ4η
√
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2
η)σ˜2α+σ2η(
√
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2
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√
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2
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3/2 ,
all evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium at µ˜α = 0, and letting
P =

 −
∂2π1F
∂x1F ∂µ˜α
− ∂2π1T
∂x1T ∂µ˜α

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

− (σ˜
2
α+σ
2
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4
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3/2
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4
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3/2


dx =

 dx1F
dx1T


we rewrite the total differential as
M · dx = Pdµ˜α
To apply Cramer’s rule we substitute P in the respective columns of M as before. The derivative we
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are searching for is
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∂µ˜α
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2
η
)
or, if we substitute σ˜α =
√
σ2ησ
2
α
σ2η+σ
2
α
,
∂x1F
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This derivative is strictly positive for F (and thus also strictly negative for T ) iff
c >
√√√√√√√√
σ2α
√
2σ2α+σ
2
η
(σ2α+σ2η)
3 +
√
σ2α
σ2α+σ
2
η
+ 1
3πσ2ασ
4
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√
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2
η
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√
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σ2α+σ
2
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and hence if this condition is met momentum exists. For example, if ση = σα = 1 we need c >
( 35)
3/4
√
π
≈
0.3846. This parallels our previous finding because for large enough c a unique equilibrium exists and
there is momentum.
Finally, the derivative of
∂x1F
∂µ˜α
with respect to poll (im)precision ση at µ˜α = 0 is
−2ση
(
2σ2α + σ
2
η
)3/2
σ2α
(
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(
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)
+ σ2η
(√
2σ2α + σ2η + πc
2σ4η
√
4σ2α + σ2η
)]
< 0
and is strictly negative. Hence, when a unique equilibrium with momentum exists, as the poll becomes
more imprecise, momentum decreases.
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Figure 10: Difference in spending for c = 2 and σǫ ∈ {1/2, 3/4, 1}. The dotted straight lines represent µ˜α ∈
{0, 1, 5/2} and intersections with the spending difference curve mark the respective equilibria. We see that at
µ˜α = 0 the spending difference is zero independent of σǫ. As we increase µ˜α the spending difference increases in
both µ˜α and σǫ. However, as we continue increasing µ˜α this changes and for example at µ˜α = 2.3 momentum is
largest when precision is smallest.
If µ˜α becomes large in absolute value, momentum may decrease. This is easiest seen by considering
the All-Pay action as a polar case of this model, featuring perfect poll precision. For | µ˜α |>
√
2
c both
candidates expend zero and thus momentum vanishes. Figure 10 illustrates how poll precision is related
to momentum using a parameterized version of the model. That proves the proposition.
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